


# **Causes of Regime breakdown Tunisia and Egypt, Economy or Hybridity?**

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Master-thesis in Comparative Politics

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## Abstract

This analysis tests regime-related and economical explanations for regime breakdowns in Tunisia and Egypt. Generalizations from four large N-studies are used to find out if the two breakdowns find themselves within the scope of these generalizations where GDP per capita, regime power-base, hybrid regimes, diffusion and former liberalizations are the main factors of explanation. As positioning in the Middle East is also mentioned as a variable delaying regime breakdown, a set of other Arab countries are added to the plot in an attempt to analyze what is often known as the “Middle Eastern exceptionalism” in regime research. The results are somewhat surprising, and the variables that seem to be the most powerful are not the economical ones, but rather those of power-base of the regimes, former liberalizations and diffusion. The diffusion variable is discussed on different levels, both as diffusion between regimes in different kinds of networks, and on sub-regime level in the form of social Medias and satellite TV channels. The power base of the regime seems to be of more importance for the regime breakdowns than degree of system hybridness. The presence of democratic institutions in the two regimes did probably not pave the way for more democratic reform, but rather delayed the regime breakdown by co-opting opposition forces giving the regime a democratic alibi. The military is added as a country-specific short-term variable, and the expected importance is confirmed in the analysis.

## Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the Institute of Comparative Politics, especially Jannicke Lervik-Kristensen for her helpfulness in dealing with different types of paperwork. I would also like to thank my three “bukkene bruse” for letting me spend time with my books and articles instead of using my scarce free time with them. I hope they cross the bridge safely to the green grass on the other side. I would also like to thank Bochra and Siv Irene for encouragement and guidance, Nesrine and Ingrid for always believing in my capacities and Olivia for pushing me forward. Lamia for keeping me fit for fight, mentally and physically. Big thanks also to my advisor, Professor Lars Svåsand for quick and valuable assistance, and at last thanks to my beloved Tunisia, may you also cross the bridge safely to the other side.

Tunis, 30<sup>th</sup> of May 2010

Reidun Breivik Andersen

”under anarchy, uncoordinated competitive theft by “roving bandits” destroys the incentive to invest and produce, leaving little for either the population or the bandits. Both can be better off if a bandit sets himself up as a dictator, - a “stationary bandit” who monopolizes and rationalizes theft in the form of taxes”

Mancur Olson<sup>1</sup>

This is a tale about two such stationary bandits and their regimes.

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<sup>1</sup> Olson, Mancur 1999, in Dictatorship, democracy and development, sept. 1999 am.pol.science review vol 87, number 3

## List of abbreviations/Arabic or French terms

Bey – title of the former King in Tunisia

Destour – Tunisian independence party, destour means constitution

FD - Femmes Democraties, (Tunisian secular woman organization)

FLN – Front de Libération National (Former Algerian governing party)

Hezb En Nadha - the Tunisian Islamist Party (the words means the Renaissance party)

Kefaya – Egyptian democracy movement (the word means it's enough!)

LTDH – Ligue Tunisienne des Droits de l'Homme (Tunisisk menneskerettighets organ)

MTI – Mouvement de Tendance Islamique (former name of En Nadha)

NDP - National Democratic Party (Governing party under Mubarak)

PSD - Partie Socialiste Destourien (Tunisian governing party under Bourguiba)

RCD - Rassemblement Constitutionel Democratique (governing party under Ben Ali)

UGTT – Union Général des Travaileurs Tunisiens (biggest tunisian labor union)

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”Je me révolte, donc nous sommes”

Albert Camus

Causes of regime breakdown in Tunisia and Egypt (2011),

- hybridity or economy?

## 1. Introduction

Before the 14<sup>th</sup> of January 2011 many local and international economists had warned against the skewed economies of the Middle East, - of the strong one-sided focus on development of tourism in countries like Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco. Demographers expressed concern about the large youth populations, often well educated, but too many without jobs. Social psychologists spoke about high level of discontent among the Arabs.

Political scientists however, were writing about the stability of the regimes in the region. Personally I was writing on a master essay on authoritarian regime mechanisms in Egypt and Morocco.

Then the 14<sup>th</sup> of January, everything changed.

Regime breakdown is a well highlighted theme in political science. Do the regime breakdowns in Tunisia and Egypt follow the mainstream generalizations made about such events? Quantitative

studies like Geddes (1999)<sup>2</sup> Teorell/Hadenius (2007)<sup>3</sup> and Brownlee (2009)<sup>4</sup> made some general remarks about regime breakdowns on the base of large N-statistical surveys. The questions asked by Teorell/Hadenius (2007) were: Are certain authoritarian regimes more likely to break down? And secondly, are certain regime types more likely to democratize?

They proved that some type of regimes tended to last longer than others. Monarchies were the longest lasting regime type, and military-regimes the most frequent to fall. Brownlee inserted several new variables into his plot (2009), and claimed to find no statistical evidence for hybrid regimes like the electoral or competitive types to have an accelerating effect on regime breakdowns. He did however find correlation with these non-electoral variables; prior liberalization, post-cold war time variable (after 1989) and economy.

The second question asked was the relationship of regime type on democratization (after a regime breakdown). The general statistics is not uplifting, since Teorell/Hadenius (2007) states that as much as 77 percent of authoritarian regime breakdowns just lead to another type of authoritarian regime. But contrary to the non-correlation on regime breakdowns, both Teorell/Hadenius(2007) and Brownlee does agree that hybridism does seem to have a positive effect on democratization after a regime breakdown. As the future of both the Tunisian and the Egyptian transitions are far from sure, and not even well under way at this moment in time, this is an issue I will not treat to the full extent in this essay, since it would involve predictions rather than science so short a time after the regime breakdowns.

The Middle East has for decades been treated as exceptional area in regime research, and to avoid bias in analysis, the region is often excluded, or treated differently than the other regions in the world. In Brownlee's (2009) analysis he adds a "Middle East" variable, expecting an already negative starting point for countries in the region.

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<sup>2</sup> Geddes, Barbara (1999) What do we know about Democratization after 20 years? *Annual Revue of political science* 1999, 2:115-44

<sup>3</sup> Hadenius, Axel and Teorell, Jan (2007), Pathways from Authoritarianism, in *Journal of Democracy* Volume 18, Number 1 January 2007

<sup>4</sup> Brownlee, Jason (2009), Portents of Pluralism: how hybrid regimes affect democratic transistions, in *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 53, No. 3, July 2009, Pp. 515–532

Since I will study only two cases, the method used is the historical comparative analysis, with a comparison of institutions and structures,- tested up to the existing theories in the field of regime breakdown of authoritarian regimes. The aim is to either confirm the existing theories, or possibly find new variables important when analyzing regime breakdowns. I will also add data from other similar Arab countries that still did not (end of May 2011) experience regime breakdowns, to strengthen the arguments made. The Arab streets has not been seen as a major force in any studies, so the sudden fall of the Tunisian regime the 14<sup>th</sup> of February due to the forth going national wave of protest was a surprise to most Middle East specialists.

Both Egypt and Tunisia are categorized as hybrid regimes, which mean that they are authoritarian in their essence, but with democratic institutions like elected parliaments and local and regional assemblies. The real power does not lie in these institutions however; it lies elsewhere in more obscure, informal organisms, out of reach of the general public. Both countries also had a range of political parties. They were more of a window-dressing to please foreign media and aid donors than a reflection of people's political choices. Both countries have had general elections for decades; none of these has been recognized by international observers as fully free and fair elections, however. The political parties have also been subject to several restrictions, and most of the official parties served more like organizations for recruitment to the elite, rather than to form real political opposition. The prime example here is that several "opposition" parties in Tunisia supported the candidacy of the sitting president Ben Ali in the 2009 elections, instead of presenting their own candidate. Voting in the parliaments also shows that all the proposed laws and regulations forwarded to the parliament by the presidents Mubarak and Ben Ali, was accepted.

Both Teorell/Hadenius (2007) and later Brownlee (2009) tested the effect of hybridity on regime breakdowns statistically. The thought behind the studies was to see if there was anything to the argument; the more hybrid, the more fragile the regime is for a breakdown. Teorell/Hadenius (2007) found that the regime type had significant effect on regime breakdown, as monarchies had a lifespan double of no party systems and more than double of that of military regimes for instance. The finding was supported by Brownlee's (2009) study, but he also tested other variables, and found that hybridity alone did not have any effect on regime breakdown. Other

correlated variables affecting regime breakdown was; prior liberalization, countries situated in the Middle East, post-cold war time variable (regime breakdown after 1989) and also, not surprisingly; economy was highly correlated to breakdown.

So, my preliminary hypotheses are;

1. Regime type had a major impact on regime breakdown in both countries
2. If the fact that the two countries had parties and parliaments did play a role, it would be as a prolonging effect on the authoritarian regimes.
3. Prior liberalizing periods had a certain accelerating effect on the regime breakdowns.
4. Economy was however the single most important factor of the regime breakdown, both as a long-term and immediate cause.
5. The role of the military was an important triggering factor in both breakdowns.
6. Diffusion via social medias played an important triggering role in the Egyptian breakdown and as a long term factor in both countries


One of my hypotheses is that hybridity didn't have an accelerating affect on the regime breakdowns in Tunisia and Egypt, quite the contrary, but like Brownlee suggests, hybridity may have a positive effect on the transition periods in the two countries.

Economical problems on the contrary, are considered to be the main reason for regime breakdown in the two countries. Traditionally, the few prior uprisings in the region have been caused by price rises or acute economical problems. Since the major demonstrations in Egypt were planned just a few days after the Tunisian regime breakdown, it is likely that diffusion is an important factor for the Egyptian regime breakdown.

On the short term scale, most of the Arab countries seem to have reached a certain psychological barrier of discontent with their authoritarian rulers, and even if the economies of the region differ greatly, it is the same discontent we find everywhere. The Egyptian movement "Kifaya"

(meaning enough) is a clear sign of this discontent crystallized a few years back.

My causal analyzing model will then look like this;



Model 1

The three first variables in the model (1-3) are long term causes taken from Brownlee's (2009) article, and the last two are my own case specific variables (A-B). Like mentioned earlier, Brownlee's variables are verified statistically in an analysis with a large number of cases. He also draws on former established work in the field, especially those of Geddes (1999/1999a<sup>5</sup>). I have chosen to draw on statistical works instead of on pure case-oriented works on regime breakdown, as I think there is a need for more generalizations and large N-studies to try to establish clearer inference in the field of regime breakdown.

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<sup>5</sup> Geddes, Barbara, 1999, "Authoritarian Breakdown: Empirical Test of a Game Theoretic Argument," paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta (1999), pp. 1-33

I think the choice of cases is quite obvious, since Tunisia and Egypt were the first two Arab regimes to break down after popular protest in decades. Lessons from these two countries could be useful for other breakdowns in the region, or possibly also in other regions later on. It is interesting to see if there is something to the much written about Middle Eastern exceptionalism (see for instance Bellin:2004)<sup>6</sup>, or if the two regimes in fact follow a world “standard” in their regime breakdowns.

To understand the internal dynamics of the regimes and the countries, a history chapter on each country also describing the last days of the regimes is to be found before the more complex theory and method chapters are introduced. The variables will be analyzed one by one starting with the economy. Regime-characteristics are then looked at before the last three variables of prior liberalizations, diffusion/social Medias and the role of the military are discussed. But first a quick journey back in time.

## 2. Historical overview

### 2.1 Egypt

After being a nation loosely under the Ottoman Empire for centuries, Egypt finally lost its independence in 1882 when French and British troops intervened after disagreement about control of the Egyptian finances. The Egyptian army was crushed, and a de facto (not official) protectorate was established. The British protectorate became official in only in 1914<sup>7</sup>.

#### 2.1.1. The forces leading to independence

After the First World War, Saad Zaghlul and the Wafd Party led the Egyptian nationalist movement, gaining a majority at the local Legislative Assembly. When the British exiled Zaghlul and his associates to Malta in 1919, Egyptians answered with an uprising against the British rule. The internal problems led Great Britain to issue a unilateral declaration of Egypt's

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<sup>6</sup> Bellin, Eva (2004) “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective”, *Comparative Politics*, vol. 36, no 2, Jan. 2004, pp. 139-157

<sup>7</sup> Historical notes taken from “The Middle East and North Africa 1995”, Regional surveys of the world, Europa Publications Limited, 1994, England.

independence on 22 February 1922. The new Egyptian Government made a new constitution in 1923 based on a parliamentary representative system. Saad Zaghlul was popularly elected as Prime Minister of Egypt in 1924. In 1936 the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was concluded, but the foreign policy was under British control and increasing political involvement by the king led to the ousting of the monarchy and the dissolution of the parliament in a military coup d'état known as the 1952 Revolution. The officers, known as the Free Officers Movement, forced King Farouk to abdicate in support of his weaker son Fuad.

On 18 June 1953, the Egyptian Republic was declared, with the popular General Muhammad Naguib as the first President of the Republic. Naguib was forced to resign in 1954 by Gamal Abdel Nasser – the real architect of the 1952 movement – and was later put under house arrest. Nasser assumed power as President in June 1956. British forces completed their withdrawal from the occupied Suez Canal Zone on 13 June 1956. The Suez Canal-nationalization on 26 July 1956 prompted the 1956 Suez Crisis.

### 2.1.2. Post-independence period

Nasser quickly centralized the power in the hands of the President, and a period of socialist policies followed, with a strong pan-Arab tone on the international arena. The loss of the 1967 Six Day War against Israel put a temporary end to Egypt's aggressive foreign policies and with Nasser's death in 1970; succession was insured by the former vice President Anwar Sadat. Sadat switched Egypt's Cold War allegiance from the Soviet Union to the United States, expelling Soviet advisors in 1972. He launched the Infitah economic reform policy, while violently clamping down on religious and secular opposition.

In 1973, Egypt, along with Syria, launched the October War, a surprise attack against the Israeli forces occupying the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights (since the 1967 war). The conflict sparked an international crisis between the two world superpowers: the US and the USSR, both of whom intervened. Two UN-mandated ceasefires put an end to the military operations. While the war ended with a military Israeli victory, it presented Sadat with a political victory that later allowed him to regain the Sinai in return for peace with Israel. Sadat made a historic visit to



Israel in 1977, which led to the 1979 peace treaty in exchange for the complete Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. Sadat's initiative sparked enormous controversy in the Arab world and led to Egypt's expulsion from the Arab League. A fundamentalist military soldier assassinated Sadat in Cairo in 1981. He was succeeded by Hosni Mubarak.

The president was also the leader of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). In February 2005, President Mubarak announced that he had ordered the reform of the country's presidential election law, paving the way for multi-candidate polls in the next presidential election. For the first time since the 1952 movement, the Egyptian people had an apparent chance to elect a leader from a list of various candidates. However, the new law, designed to prevent candidates like Aymen Nour from standing against Mubarak, placed complex restrictions on the filing for presidential candidacies, and led to a clear re-election of Mubarak.

Concerns were again expressed after the 2005 presidential elections about Government interference in the election process through fraud and vote-rigging, along with police brutality and violence by pro-Mubarak supporters against opposition demonstrators. After the election, Nour was imprisoned, and the U.S. Government stated their disapproval of his conviction. As a result, most Egyptians are skeptical about the process of democratization and the role of the elections. Less than 25 percent of the country's 32 million registered voters turned out for the 2005 elections (Hamzawy:2010)<sup>8</sup>.

In 2007, thirty-four constitutional changes voted on by parliament prohibit parties from using religion as a basis for political activity; allow the drafting of a new anti-terrorism law to replace the emergency legislation in place since 1981, giving police wide powers of arrest and surveillance; give the president power to dissolve parliament; and end judicial monitoring of election. As opposition members of parliament withdrew from voting on the proposed changes, it was expected that the referendum would be boycotted by a great number of Egyptians in protest of what has been considered a breach of democratic practices. Eventually it was reported that only 27percent of the registered voters went to the polling stations under heavy police presence

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<sup>8</sup> Hamzawy, Amr (2010), "Egypt's Legitimacy Crisis in the Aftermath of Flawed Elections", Carnegie Commentary, December 2, 2010, on [www.carnegieendowment.org](http://www.carnegieendowment.org)

and tight political control of the ruling National Democratic Party. It was officially announced on 27 March 2007 that 75.9percent of those who participated in the referendum approved of the constitutional amendments introduced by President Mubarak and was endorsed by an opposition free parliament, thus allowing the introduction of laws that curb the activity of certain opposition elements, particularly the Islamists. As for the legal system in general, it is based on Islamic and civil law (particularly napoleonic codes). The judicial review takes place by in the Supreme Court (Berg:2009)<sup>9</sup>.

### 2.1.3. Foreign policy

Cairo has been a crossroads of regional commerce and culture for centuries, and its intellectual and Islamic institutions are at the center of the region's social and cultural development. The permanent Headquarters of the Arab League are located in Cairo and the Secretary General of the Arab League has traditionally been an Egyptian. Former Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa is the current Secretary General. The Arab League briefly moved from Egypt to Tunis in 1978, as a protest to the signing by Egypt of a peace treaty with Israel, but returned in 1989.

Egypt was the first Arab state to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, with the signing of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty in 1979. Despite the peace treaty, Israel is still largely considered an enemy country within Egypt. Egypt has a major influence among other Arab states, and has historically played an important role as a mediator in resolving disputes between various Arab states, and in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Egypt is a Major non-NATO ally of the United States.

### 2.1.4. Parliament and the presidency

The political power is organized under a multi-party semi-presidential system where the executive power is theoretically divided between the President and the Prime Minister. In practice it rests almost solely with the President who traditionally has been elected in single-

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<sup>9</sup> Berg, Ole T. (2009), "Egypt – stat og styresett", Sist endret: 22.04.2009, fra [www.snl.no](http://www.snl.no)

candidate elections for more than fifty years. Egypt also holds regular multi-party parliamentary elections (Berg:2009).

### 2.1.5. Opposition groups and civil society

In 2003, the Egyptian Movement for Change, popularly known as Kefaya, was launched to seek a return to democracy and greater civil liberties. Kefaya means “it’s enough!”. The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) is one of the longest-standing bodies for the defense of human rights in Egypt. In 2003, the Government established the National Council for Human Rights, with its’ headquarter in Cairo and headed by former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali who reports directly to the President. The council has come under heavy criticism by local NGO activists, who claim it undermines human rights work in Egypt by serving as a propaganda tool for the Government to excuse its violations and to give legitimacy to repressive laws such as the recently renewed Emergency Law. Egypt had announced in 2006 that it was in the process of abolishing the Emergency Law, but in March 2007 President Mubarak approved several constitutional amendments to include in an anti-terrorism law that gave police wide powers of arrest and surveillance (Lerand:2009)<sup>10</sup>.

### 2.1.6. Economy

During the several wars in the 60ies and 70ies, Egyptian economy suffered due to very high military expenses. It is one of the poorer Arabic countries in terms of GDP per capita, and the high population growth rate since the time of the independence has created a large demand for job creation, and made Egypt the most populous Arab country. The socialist policies in the 60ies and 70ies did establish a complex redistribution system by a number of subsidies, but with economical problems in the 80ies, the subsidies were constantly reduced. The country is also receiving large sums of remittances from Egyptians living abroad, and the Gulf crises in the 1990ies reduced these remittances drastically.

With all agriculture being concentrated on the side of the Nile, the Aswan dam project launched by Nasser made a stabilizing effect on the agricultural production by regulating the water levels.

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<sup>10</sup> Leraand, Dag, (2009), ”Egypt – egypt under Mubarak”, artikkel Sist endret: 13.04.2009 fra [www.snl.no](http://www.snl.no)

From the 1980ies the petroleum industry increased, and became the biggest export sector. The tourist sector was also one of the sectors with the largest investment rates from the 1980ies and onwards, creating huge tourist resorts like Sharm el Sheik and Hurgada. The Suez canal is still the largest passage route from Europe to Asia, but the last few years the pirates on the Somali coast has slowed the traffic somewhat (Leraand:2009a)<sup>11</sup>.

## 2.2. Tunisia

With the rising of the Ottoman Empire, Tunisia came under the power of the Sultan of Istanbul from the 15<sup>th</sup> century until the French protectorate was established in 1881. Like most of the other African states, the excuse for foreign intervention was the chaotic economic situation of the local countries. The global economy was in its making, and the regional powers had lent large sums in international lending institutions to fund either infrastructure, or to quell local uprisings.

Tunisia was among the last of its Arab neighbors to come under European control, having a strong civil elite and a relatively modern bureaucracy. The process of modernization had started in the 1830ies, and it was the first Arab country with a modern constitution, dating back to 1861 (Lacoste:1991:54). However, the fate of Tunisia was sealed at the congress of Berlin in 1878 when the European power divided the world between them, letting Tunisia fall into the French sphere of influence. The protectorate was official in 1881 with the signature of the Tunisian Bey (Lacoste:1991:54).

### 2.2.1. The French Protectorate

The Tunisian protectorate differed from the French protectorate in Algeria by having only an indirect administrative control of the country (Lacoste:1991:56). Only the military and the foreign affairs were under direct French control. But as the French establishes more and more parallel organs, influencing new areas, and also confiscating more and more land for French settlers, nationalist organizations starts to form.

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<sup>11</sup> Leraand, Dag (2009a), "Egypt – næringsliv og økonomisk utvikling", fra [www.snl.no](http://www.snl.no)

### 2.2.2. The forces leading to independence

The first important nationalist movement was that of the young Tunisians of 1908 (Lawless, 1994:870)<sup>12</sup>. Inspiration came from the Young Turk movement, and their demand was the re-institution of the power of the Bey along with democratic reforms. It was inspired by the Egyptian nationalist movement, and in the political party of Destour (meaning constitution) was established in 1920. Their aim was an elected constitutional assembly with self-governing rights. The French tried to please the movement by giving Tunisians more seats in economic councils, but still demanding more reforms, the leadership was finally exiled and the movement was dissolved in 1925 (Lawless:1994:871).

In 1934 the Tunisian lawyer Habib Bourguiba established the so called neo Destour, but after large scale political agitation Bourguiba was exiled soon after. Meanwhile however, the party spread to all parts of the country, and after a successful general strike in 1938, 200 activists were arrested and martial law was proclaimed. The Second World War freezed main parts of the movement's activities, but after 1945 it became active again. Bourguiba however fled to Cairo in 1945 and led some of the activities of the movement from abroad. The national leader at the time was Salah Ben Youssef. Only in 1949 did Bourguiba return to Tunisia, and after years of negotiations a mixed government was formed in 1950. The government however came under attack from both French settlers (10 percent of the current population) and more radical Tunisian elements. The alliance with some of the neo-destour members with the powerful trade unions led to numerous strikes in 1952, and the leadership of both organizations were consequently imprisoned (Lawless:1994:871).

The government was changed, but it did not improve the situation in the country. Terrorists acts was made by French settlers' groups (the red hand), and then by counter attack from the Tunisian side. With the instauration of the new French P.M. Mendes France in 1954 a more moderate side of the French regime presented itself, and real negotiations for independence soon started.

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<sup>12</sup> Lawless, Richard (1994) writing the Tunisia section in The middle east and north Africa 1995, Europa Publications Limited, 1994

Internal autonomy was granted and an all Tunisian government was established in 1955. Consequently, the two independence movements leaders, Bourguiba and Ben Youssef could return to the country. Ben Youssef and his followers opposed the autonomy agreement however, and internal fractions led to the expulsion of Ben Youssef from the neo Destour that same year. Bourguiba signed the final independence documents the 20<sup>th</sup> of March 1956 (Lawless:1994:871). In the agreement, France got to keep their military base in the northern Tunisian city of Bizerte.

### 2.2.3. Post-independence period

The relations with France was difficult the years after independence, and it escalated into regular war in the so-called Bizerte-crises, that was settled only in 1963 leaving 800 Tunisians dead. France had large problems in neighboring Algeria at that time, and decided to leave their Tunisian base in Bizerte however(Lawless:1994:872). The expulsion of the Ben Youssef-wing of the neo destour party before independence laid the ground for an exclusivist regime, and after having banned a strong communist party, the neo destour established a one party system that lasted until 1989.

### 2.2.4. Parliament and the presidency

After a constitutional assembly deposed the king in 1957(or the Bey as he is called in Tunisia), Bourguiba was made head of state and stayed president until he himself was deposed in a bloodless coup in 1987.

The constitution of 1959 gave the president large powers like election of government, the laying down of the general policy of the state, the supreme command of the armed forces and the appointing of civil and military posts (Lawless:1994:872). The Parliament had a few powers (approval for declaration of war and peace treaties among others), but in the 1959 elections the neo destour gained all the parliamentary seats, and Bourguiba could then implement freely his own policies.

Multiparty elections were held from 1981 and onwards, but it was only in the 1994 elections that other political parties were represented in the parliament for the first time since independence

(Lawless: 1994:883).

### 2.2.5. Opposition groups and civil society

After the suppression of the Ben Youssef wing and later on, the communist party, two main groups have been in opposition to government policies; the labor union “Union General des Travaileurs Tunisiens”(UGTT) and different kinds of islamist groups. The labor unions relation to the regime is like a rollercoaster-ride( Cavallo:253)<sup>13</sup>. When it has shown itself too strong (for instance during uprisings in the 1970ies and 1980ies), the regime has answered with massive arrests and has curtailed their activity significantly (Lawless:1994:874). Perhaps realizing that the unions power was too difficult to curb, the presidential party, now called PSD (Partie Socialist Destourien), joined forces with the UGTT and formed a national front for the first pluralist elections for decades in 1981. Not surprisingly, the front won all the seats in the national assembly that year. The front did last until the run-up for the following elections in 1985. Before the elections in 1981 over 50 of the leaders in the so-called Islamic tendency movement (MTI) were arrested, making them, and not the UGTT the main regime opposition (Lawless:1994:875). The next regime crack-down came in 1986-7 with massive arrests and death-sentences issued.

The legal opposition parties and the independent human rights group LTDH (Ligue Tunisienne des Droits de l’Homme) strongly opposed the arrests, leading to the arrest of the LTDH-leader himself and the establishment of a pro-regime human rights agency to counter the power of the LTDH.

Many hoped for a permanent push towards democracy with the social contract made between the new president Ben Ali and all the important groups in the Tunisian society in the end of the 1980ies. Ben Ali deposed Bourguiba using signatures from seven doctors saying he was unable to rule. He was at that time Prime Minister himself and had formerly been Minister of Interior. A year or so of liberalization was experienced with releasing of political prisoners and opening up of press and other freedoms, before a new crack-down started in 1990 (Lawless:1994:879).

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<sup>13</sup> Cavallo, Delphine in Lust-Okar, Ellen and Zerhouni, Saloua 2008, Political participation in the Middle East, Lynne Reiner Pub., the chapter of Cavallo is called “trade unions in Tunisia”.

### 2.2.6. Economy

Two thirds of the Tunisian land is suitable for some kind of agriculture. Citrus-plantations are found in the northern part, corn-fields in the north and the center, and olive-trees in the center-south and the coastal regions. Most economists agree that the sector has been mainly neglected, and has seen only small modernization efforts since the independence.

Tunisia is among the world's largest phosphate producers, and the mines are found in the Gafsa/Redeyef-region (south-west). The country also has a gas and petroleum production, mainly for domestic use. The rest of the domestic need for natural gas is gained from lending their land to the Algerian-Italian gas pipe.

Under the Bourguiba period large industrialization projects were stated, with leather and textile as the main products. This industry has been suffering since the end of the 1970ies due to harsh competition from Asia. From the 1960ies and onwards, the tourist-sector has received government incentives, and the main infrastructural investments have been done close to the home-cities of the two presidents, the so-called Sahel area (coastal area in the center-east).

In terms of statistics, Tunisia is considered a middle income country in the upper level. The growth has been quite steady, especially under the Ben Ali period, and international financial institutions praised the economic policies of the regime (Lawless:1994:885-899). Even after the launching of the Maghreb union, the main trade partners are still France, Germany and Italy. The intra-Arab trade remains small.

## 2.3. Tunisia's regime breakdown

The last 15 years at least demonstrations were unheard of in Tunisia. Some sporadic efforts had been made to show opposition against the censorship laws, but the regime almost always managed to locate the leaders of such initiatives, and hence stop any demonstration from taking place. There is however one exception. Today, the uprisings in the southern town of Redeyef/Gafsa in 2008 is considered to be the seed of the demonstrations that lead to the fall



down of the regime in 2011.

### 2.3.1. The Gafsa/Redeyef uprisings in 2008

The demonstrations for dignity and fair distribution of jobs available at the Gafsa mining company in January and February 2008 broke the Ben Ali image of social peace in Tunisia. The events were unspoken of in the national media, and internet restrictions were increased after the event to prevent the spreading of videos from the demonstrations. 300 persons were detained and many of them were tortured according to an Amnesty report (Amnesty International report:2009)<sup>14</sup>. Some were given prison sentences up to 8 years. It was the favoritism of the local authorities to give all new jobs to their friends and relatives that's lightened the spark of the uprisings, and the area was encircled by the security forces a long period afterwards. Foreign media or embassy personnel were not allowed to enter the district. The trade union, UGTT, was a major driving force behind the demonstrations. Demonstrators said that at least 26 persons were injured by police firing in the demonstrations, and two dead (Amnesty international report, 2009: 6).

Even with the silence of the national media, most Tunisians did have some knowledge about the uprisings, mostly through what Tunisians call “the Arab phone”, simply by spreading information by talking to family and friends. Most people were too afraid to discuss such events on social network sites, knowing that the regime was heavily controlling such sites.

### 2.3.2. Bouazizi and The General strikes

Almost two years later, uprisings started again in the same region, and the reasons were quite similar,- only this time a more dramatic event sparked the demonstrations. On December the 17<sup>th</sup> a young vegetable salesman named Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire after having been deprived of his only source of living and insulted publicly by a police officer. Bouazizi had higher education, but did not find any job to support his widowed mother and sisters, so he ended

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<sup>14</sup> Amnesty International report 2009, index 30/003/2009, Behind Tunisia's economic miracle; inequality and criminalization of protest

up selling vegetables in the local market, without a license. Demonstrations against government abuse and lack of job-opportunities sparked demonstrations in Bouazizis home town of Sidi Bou Sid that same day and later spread to the whole region (Al Jazeera.net, 2011)<sup>15</sup>. In some of the uprisings government buildings were destroyed or set on fire, and after big demonstrations in Thala and Kasserine the 8-12<sup>th</sup> of January , 66 persons were reported killed since the start of the uprisings in December, a number shocking the Tunisian public.

By then, the bar association with its 8000 members had entered the demonstrations by declaring a general strike the 6<sup>th</sup> of January. Local labor unions then announced general strikes in all the three major cities of Sfax (the 12<sup>th</sup>), Sousse (the 13<sup>th</sup>), culminating with the capital Tunis the 14<sup>th</sup> of January. Then in the afternoon, the 14<sup>th</sup> of January the prime minister announces that Ben Ali has left the country leaving him in charge. Ali Seriati, head of the presidential security forces, probably tried to perform a coup d'état when asking the president to leave (for some days),- but he was stopped by the leader of the armed forces, Rached Ben Ammar. Ben Ammar is now known as man who said no to Ben Ali when being asked to crush the demonstrations. No military personnel fired on any demonstrators during the uprisings. Even if demonstrations continued for many weeks after the departure of Ben Ali, the first step of what was to be known as the Jasmine revolution was taken.

## 2.4. Egypt's regime breakdown

Just days after the Tunisian regime fell, Egyptians started their own demonstrations. Tunisians had now proved it was possible to achieve their goals and this was a major incentive for similar uprisings all over the Arab world. However, Egyptians were not unfamiliar with demonstrations, and the most important took place in an industrial city north of Cairo, just after the Redeyef uprisings in Tunisia in 2008.

### 2.4.1. The Mahalla uprisings in 2008

The industrial city of Mahalla, some hours north of Cairo had for years been the center for labor unrest. Strikes on a large scale had been held yearly since 2006, but the April 2008 strikes led to

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<sup>15</sup> Online Al Jazeera article, [aljazeera.net/english](http://aljazeera.net/english), Timeline: Egypt's revolution, dated 14.2.2011.

large demonstrations where youth also joined the uprisings to share their general discontentment with Mubarak's economic policies. Demonstrations of such magnitude had not been seen in Egypt since the independence in 1952, and several clashes with the security forces lead to 2 deaths and many more injured (Gopal:2011)<sup>16</sup>. Both wages and job insecurity was a concern for the workers as large part of the economy was being privatized. For the first time in Egypt, the picture of the president was publicly stepped on, and the crowds shouted "down with Mubarak". Mass arrests were made, but the happenings sparked a new movement crucial for the organization of the 2011-events.

### 2.4.2. April 6<sup>th</sup> movement

The April 6<sup>th</sup> youth movement was born out of the Mahalla uprisings. What started as a face book site sympathizing with the labor demonstrations, ended up being an apparatus for future uprisings (Carnegieendowment:2010)<sup>17</sup>. It claimed to have 70.000 members in 2009, and they had launched several campaigns and support groups since their beginnings. Crucial however was their logistical role during the uprisings in 2011.

### 2.4.3. The day of rage

Even if demonstrations had taken place some days already, the first large demonstration took place on January the 25<sup>th</sup>, and coincided with a national holiday to commemorate the police forces (Flanagan:2011)<sup>18i</sup>. Demonstrations were held simultaneously in most Egyptian cities, but the largest one was the Tahrir-square demonstration in Cairo. Social networkers constantly updated information about closed areas, but clashes with the police forces are experienced from day one in Cairo, leaving deaths on both sides. Learning from the Tunisian experience, social network sites are closed down the 27<sup>th</sup> of January, and the government blames the uprisings on the Muslim brotherhood, and several arrests are being made. The 28<sup>th</sup>, most mobile and text message services are closed down, making it almost impossible for the demonstrators to

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<sup>16</sup> Gopal, Anand (2011) article online in Foreign Policy, Egypt's caluldron of revolt, 16.2.2011  
<http://www.foreignpolicy.com>

<sup>17</sup> Online Carnegie endowment article "the April 6 youth movement", in the Carnegie guide to the Egypt's election

<sup>18</sup> Flanagan, Ainegeal, ed. For the Qantara publication: Egypt's day of rage, online on [www.quantara.de](http://www.quantara.de). The article is a translation from Al Masry Al Youm, dated 28.2.2011

communicate. The immensely popular news network Al Jazeera saw its Cairo offices being closed, and the channel taken off air. The protesters arrange their own security checkpoints to avoid people with weapons entering the square. After more than two weeks of protests, Mubarak finally stepped down, and a military council was put in power of the country.

### 3. Theory and definitions

Before going on further to discuss the theoretical foundations of the analysis, it is important to understand the definitions used. The one already mentioned in the introduction is different ways of categorizing regimes.

#### 3.1. Definitions

##### 3.1.1. Regime Breakdown

The dependent variable is regime breakdown in Tunisia and Egypt 2011. I could use the word revolution; see for instance Goldstones definition (Mahoney/Rueschmeyer:2003: 53)<sup>19</sup>, “a progressive and irreversible change in the institutions and values that provided the basis of political authority”. But since the regime breakdowns are only a few months back in time, and the continuation of the change is uncertain, I content myself by using the word regime breakdown. Most of the institutions of the “ancien regime”, has broken down. The headquarters of the former ruling parties of NDP and RCD are emptied, their properties confiscated, and the parties dissolved. The presidents have irreversibly left their chairs to other persons (even if Ben Ali thought he would only be on a short leave of absence). What will follow is uncertain, but the Ben Ali and Mubarak regimes as we knew them do not exist anymore.

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<sup>19</sup> Mahoney, James and Rueschmeyer, Dietrich (2003) *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, Cambridge University Press

### 3.1.2. Authoritarianism

Philippe Droz-Vincent (2004)<sup>20</sup> calls authoritarianism “a mechanism aiming at exclusion and limitation of political pluralism (own translation, p. 947). Essential decisions are being made by a small group of people. It differs from totalitarianism because it have to open up to a few selected groups, since it does not have the resources to repress all opposition at all times. Many researchers have in fact called them bunker states (Droz-Vincent:2004:948), referring to the Hitler regimes last days. A number of other names have circulated also, in an effort to distinguish these regimes from democratic, transitional regimes to democracy and totalitarian regimes. It is important however, not to continue to put all the non-democratic regimes in one big sack, simply calling them negations of democracy. Authoritarian regimes are systems with their own type of internal logic, and a negation is not a sufficient tool in understanding how these regimes works. What further makes the negation-definition difficult is the undergoing liberalization (and de-liberalizations) in many authoritarian regimes. Liberalization has often been considered as a step towards democracy, a beginning of a democratization process, this has not been the case however in most Middle Eastern countries.

Authoritarian regimes differ as much within their own group as they differ from democracy (Geddes:1999:121)<sup>21</sup>, so to study them one has to carefully identify and classify them. After Geddes’ article several such efforts have been made, and one main areas of classification has been identifying the different types of hybrid regimes.

The different categorization stresses different qualifications of these regimes, and they are therefore not mutually exclusive. In this paper I will use both Geddes (1999) and Brownlee’s (2009) classifications and also try to find the best way to categorize what I will call hybrid regimes. The hybrid literature is concerned with identifying the presence of democratic institutions like elections, political parties and assemblies like parliaments in authoritarian regimes.

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<sup>20</sup> Philippe Droz-Vincent (2004), *Quel avenir pour l’autoritarisme dans le monde Arabe?*, *Revue française de science politique*, vol 54, no 6, decembre 2004, p. 945-979.

<sup>21</sup> Geddes, Barbara (1999) *What do we know about Democratization after 20 years?* *Annual Review of political science* 1999, 2:115-44

### 3.1.2.1 Defining Hybrid Regimes

In 2002, Larry Diamond published his much cited article on Hybrid regimes (2002)<sup>22</sup>. The term used was not originally his own invention, but he illustrated in a new manner the regime landscape in between closed authoritarian regimes and democracies. He presented two classifications, those of competitive authoritarian (taken from Levitsky and Way 2002)<sup>23</sup> and hegemonic electoral authoritarian regimes (here he draws on Schedlers term electoral authoritarianism (2002))<sup>24</sup>. He also had a residual category called “ambiguous regimes”. In my view the term hybrid is quite elegant, leading our thoughts to hybrid cars. These types of cars can swift from normal petrol to more environmental fuels when the driver wishes. In hybrid regimes the ruler can present their rule as democratic (mostly to the outside world) pointing at their elections and democratic institutions. But internally they still rule in their old authoritarian way through more or less informal authoritarian institutions.

The possibility to switch from one system to another is just one feature of these regimes. To distinguish the different type of hybrids, more specific classifications are needed. Let’s first start with the term competitive authoritarian regimes. Levitsky and Way (2002:52) says;

“In competitive authoritarian regimes, formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the principal means of obtaining and exercising political authority. Incumbents violate those rules so often and to such an extent, however, that the regime fails to meet conventional minimum standards for democracy (2002:52).

Levitsky and Way (2002) criticize the other definitions like semi-democratic because it includes the notion that these regimes are in transition towards democracy, instead of being a product of specific national historical happenings. Not all hybrid regimes are in transitions (like Carothers also states (2002))<sup>25</sup>, the hybrids do constitute a particular, exclusive regime category according

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<sup>22</sup> Diamond, Larry (2002), Elections without democracy, thinking about hybrid regimes, in Journal of Democracy Volume 13, Number 2 April 2002

<sup>23</sup> Levitsky, Steven and Lucan A. Way. 2002. “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism.” Journal of Democracy 13, No. 2 (April): 51-65.

<sup>24</sup> Schedler, Andreas. 2002a. “The Nested Game of Democratization by Elections.” International Political Science Review 23: 1.

<sup>25</sup> Carothers, Thomas. 2002. “The End of the Transition Paradigm.” Journal of Democracy 13, No.

to Levitsky and Way(2002). A change from this type of regime can go both towards more democratic, but also to more authoritarian.

The other term of hegemonic electoral regimes are defined by Diamond by the use of several classification data (Diamond,2002:29). In addition to Freedom House scores, he adds three other criteria: “the percentage of legislative seats held by the ruling party, the percentage of the vote won by the ruling party presidential candidate, and the years the incumbent ruler has continuously been in power”. For a regime to fall in the competitive category there has to be significant opposition in the parliament, and a hope at least for a change during presidential elections.

As one it is one of the latest and most easily operationalized categorizations of hybrid regimes, I have decided to use Brownlee’s (2009:254) categories of closed authoritarian systems, hegemonic authoritarian system and finally competitive authoritarian systems. His categorization is taken from all of the above-mentioned articles of Schelder/Diamond and Levitsky/Way. The categories are more closely identified under the methodological chapter.

### 3.1.2.2 Power base of Regimes

To further describe regime characteristics of the case-countries one can draw on Geddes well known study (1999). She adds the personal, military and single party as categorization of non-democratic regimes, and these could be used to further identify the regime types of pre-revolution Egypt and Tunisia and also the other Arab regimes added for the sake of comparison. Geddes combines her characteristics in different manners, ending up with 7 different categories (Geddes 1999:133) which are the following (except of the three already mentioned): military/personal, Single-Party/personal, Single/party military and Single-Party Military-personal. The regimes are categorized “based on a series of coding questions” (Brownlee:2009:525) “most of which relate to the background and operations of the ruling elite”. For this reason I have decided to call her categorization “power base of regime”, while the other categorization of hybridity in concentrating on the level of existence of democratic institutions in

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1 (January): 5-21.

authoritarian regimes. The exact codification of the regime types is mentioned under the methodological chapter.

Geddes essay was written before the hybrid literature, but since some of the latest quantitative research (like Brownlee (2009)) have difficulties in establishing correlations between type of hybrid regime and regime breakdowns, I have chosen to use two types of authoritarian regime categorizations as the differences between them might reveal interesting effects on regime breakdowns. Geddes categories are also valuable as a way of understanding internal power struggles in the informal as well as the formal institutions of authoritarian regimes. The hybrid literature does not alter these kinds of relations.

### 3.1.2.3 Liberalization versus democratization

In simple terms democratization is a transition, or a change of a non-democratic regime to democracy. Most literature recognize several waves of democratization, the first being the establishment of democracies in Western Europe and the US/Canada. The second wave the democratic transitions in Southern Europe and the third in Eastern Europe mainly.

Democratization is a process with a clear end result (Schlumberger/Albrecht:2004:375)<sup>26</sup>, namely that of democracy. One should be careful to distinguish between democratization and liberalization, defined below. Democratization constitutes a full-fledged transition towards the establishment of the political institutions mentioned in Dahl's democracy-definition (Dahl:2000)<sup>27</sup>, and the new regime should also be measured up to his criteria of ideal democracy. One should not use the word democratization for any transition away from a non-democratic regime however. Carothers (2002, p.9)<sup>28</sup> mentions that less than 20 of a 100 countries in transitions "are clearly en route to becoming success-full, well-functioning democracies".

Contrary to democratization, liberalization is not a process with a clear end result. Neither does it need to include large parts of the political institutions or the society. The regime can target the parts of the institutions or the society that they wishes to liberalize, and one important point is

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<sup>26</sup> Albrecht/Schlumberger, 2004, "Waiting for Godot, regime change without democratization in the Middle East", *International Political Science Review* 2004;25;371.

<sup>27</sup> Dahl, Robert A. 2000, *On Democracy*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London

<sup>28</sup> Thomas Carothers; 2002, The end of the transition paradigm, *Journal of Democracy*, 13;1 (2002)



that liberalization, often in contrast to democratization, is reversible. It is fully possible to de-liberalize in times where the regimes consider it necessary (Schlumberger/Albrecht;2004:373-374)<sup>29</sup>, if the regime possesses the strength to do so. Liberalizations are targeted whereas democratization is aiming at a full-fledged change towards the establishing of democracy.

As for the classification of possible prior liberalizations, the Freedom house civil liberties scores will be used as indicators of liberalization. This is in accordance with researchers like Brownlee (2009).

### 3.1.3. Diffusion effects

Strangely enough, diffusion is seldom considered a scientific variable in political research, probably due to the difficulties in measuring it. Brinks and Coppedge (2006)<sup>30</sup> however claim to have created statistical correlations when testing if “countries tend to change their regimes to match the average degree of democracy or non-democracy found among their contiguous neighbors and countries in the US sphere of influence” (Brinks/Coppedge:2006:463). The bigger the gap between the country and their sphere of influence/neighbors, the bigger the reward and the drive towards change to match its neighbors or its sphere of influence. The change can be either towards more democracy or in fact less so, depending on the average freedom level in the sphere of influence/neighbors. The definition of diffusion used by Brinks/Coppedge (2006:468) is short and efficient, in my view, and it is as follows: “the process by which an innovation communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system”. The model is further commented on under the inference chapter.

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<sup>29</sup> Albrecht/Schlumberger, 2004, p.373-4.

<sup>30</sup> Brinks, Daniel and Coppedge, Michael, Diffusion is no illusion, Comparative political Studies, vol. 39, no 4, May 2006, pp. 463-489, Sage Publications

### 3.1.3.1 Social Medias and TV satellite networks as diffusion channels: blocked diffusion

Social medias and the TV satellite networks has been repeatedly commented on as a major force in the happenings in Egypt and Tunisia, both as a long term educator of democratic argumentation and as a short term vital communication source during and after the regime breakdowns. Since Brinks/Coppedge (2006) does not specify the channels of diffusion I would like to specify the Social Medias and TV satellite networks at important channels of diffusion (essentially Al Jazeera, but also other channels like al Arabiya). By looking at the spreading of internet and TV satellite networks in the region, I would argue that diffusion of the ideas and behaviors of democratic citizens has been spreading in the region for at least a decade. This diffusion effect is not traceable in the Freedom House scores however, since the information gained could not be expressed in the societies in the Middle East. I therefore choose to call this effect blocked diffusion, and will use internet user frequencies numbers for the countries to argue for the presence of such an effect since it cannot be measured in the model mentioned above due to lacking changes in the Freedom House scores.

### 3.1.4. The question of legitimacy

Several authors (se for instance Jamal/Lust Okar:2002)<sup>31</sup> suggest that different kinds of regimes have different levels of legitimacy per se, something that makes them create different types of institutions. As even authoritarian regimes cannot rule solely by the treat of using force it needs some kind of legitimacy to exercise its functions. Thomas Carothers (2011)<sup>32</sup> says that a country like Tunisia relies on what he calls performance legitimacy and that Ben Ali stayed in power as long as he could show off the great economic success-story of Tunisia. When the holes in his success became more and more apparent, his legitimacy slowly faded among large parts of the population. The legitimacy of monarchs in the region is naturally bigger than that of a

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<sup>31</sup> Jamal, Amaney Ahmad and Lust Okar, Ellen (2002) , Rulers and rules, Reassessing the Influence of RegimeT ype on Electoral Law Formation Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 35 No. 3, April 2002 337-366

<sup>32</sup> Carothers, Thomas, (2011) Tunisia, lessons of an authoritarian collapse, commentary made on [www.carnegieendowment.org](http://www.carnegieendowment.org), the 14th of january 2011

presidential system, as monarchs has more than “one leg to stand on”. Monarchs are often religious leaders and they or their fathers were often independence heroes and they therefore generally have a stronger natural legitimacy than presidents. Logically the two case countries would be more fragile to uprisings than their neighboring monarchies like Jordan or Morocco.

### 3.1.5. Informal institutions

Many of the regime categorizations described include notions of different types of institutions, like political parties, parliaments and elections. However, when analyzing authoritarian regimes, the informal institutions must also be considered. Many researchers consider these to be of much higher importance than the formal ones (see for instance Geddes (1999:133) Informal institutions are tricky to analyze, especially in quantitative analysis, where concise and mutually exclusive categories are important for the analytical result. On a qualitative level however, there are several ways of describing such institutions, one of the most common is by using game-theoretical arguments (see for instance Lust Okar in Schlumberger (2007)<sup>33</sup>. Geddes study also considers this side of the authoritarian regimes by using her categories, so this is just another good reason for using Geddes categorization.

One of the main characteristics of authoritarian regimes is the inefficiency of formal institutions, and the importance of informal ones. Helmke/Levitsky (2004:728)<sup>34</sup> classifies informal institutions in four different categories: Complementary, Substitutive, Accommodating and Competing. If a country has informal institutions of the complementary or substitutive types, the formal institutions tend to become inefficient. I will use the transparency corruption percentiles to make comparison about the strength of the informal institutions. I wished to have used information from the World Value Survey in this field, but statistics from Tunisia are not available and are therefore not possible to use as it is one of the two case countries.

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<sup>33</sup> Lust Okar, Ellen, her chapter in the book of Schlumberger, Oliver (2007), *Debating Arab Authoritarianism*, Stanford University Press. Lust Okars chapter is called; the management of opposition: formal structures of contestation and informal political manipulation in Egypt, Jordan and Morocco

<sup>34</sup> Helmke, Gretchen and Levitsky, Steven (2004) Informal institutions and comparative politics, a research agenda, in *Perspectives on politics* December 2004, vol 2, no 4

Informal institutions matter both in terms of economics and regime research. I will therefore comment on them both under the economy-variables and the regime variables. The comparable strength of the informal institutions however will be measured by corruption percentiles as mentioned above for the two case countries and also for the other comparable Arab neighbors.

## 3.2 Defining possible inference

### 3.2.1. The effect of regime type on regime breakdown

So, to sum up the definitional side of the regime variables;

- On the side of formal institutions, the regimes are to be identified as one or several of the following categories; either as closed, hegemonic or competitive authoritarian regime,
- then; further characteristics are added; are the regimes either personalist, military or single party, or perhaps a mix of these?
- Finally, the role of informal institutions will be considered and compared.

In Teorell/Hadenius study (2006)<sup>35</sup> Tunisia and Egypt are coded as dominant party authoritarian systems from respectively 1994-2003 and 1976-2003, and as one party traditional authoritarian regimes for the previous time periods ((2006:27-9).

Brownlee (2009) has categorized both Tunisia and Egypt as hegemonic electoral regimes in his 1975-2006 group of research because the opposition never had over 25 percent in their respective parliaments. His categorization is a specification of that of Diamond (2002) who also classify the two countries under the hegemonic electoral regime category, but his terms of classification were not as clear-cut as those of Brownlee, something he himself points out (Diamond, 2002:29)

Brownlee's categorization has its base in the World Bank database of political institutions, under the category LIEC, commented on under the methodological chapter. To get cases further back he made double sets of categories by extending Geddes study by adding the last ten years, and

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<sup>35</sup> Hadenius, Axel and Teorell, Jan (2006) Authoritarian regimes: stability, change and pathways to democracy 1972-2003, working paper no 331, november 2006, Lund University

Tunisia is here coded as single party regime since 1957 to 2006 and Egypt as Single party/personal/military regime from 1952 to 2006.

The second independent variable is that of degree of hybridness and its effect on regime breakdown. The logic is simple; the more democratic features a hybrid authoritarian regime possess, the more prone should it be to experience a regime breakdown. This logic has its roots in modernization and transition theory that often presented an image of a long one-way road from totalitarian regimes to the “democratic heaven”. Both Teorell/Hadenius (2007) and Brownlee (2009) did find that some type of regimes have a longer life-span than others, one-party system and monarchy was the regimes with the longest durability, while Teorell/Hadenius (2007) found two hybrid types of regimes (dominant and non-dominant limited multiparty) to be the shortest-lived ones. Teorell/Hadenius use of data is criticized by Brownlee (2009), who instead of Freedom House scores uses the World Bank political institutions as a basis for his statistical analysis. He links the presence of democratic institutions in authoritarian regimes directly to regime breakdown, and he did not find a valid correlation.

Both analyses did however find a correlation of hybridness on transitions to democracy, but this theme will not be discussed thoroughly here, since the outcome of the transitions of the two cases in question is still not clear. The last few years several authors has claimed that the democratic institutions in authoritarian regimes was established to contain the opposition, and therefore possibly to prolong the durability of the regime (se for instance Albrecht/Wegner; 2006). So it is possible that hybridness has a reverse effect on regime breakdown, in any case this variable is considered to be a long-term variable.

Geddes’ (Geddes:1999 and 1999a) starting point was to find out if different type of authoritarian regimes breaks down differently and more frequently. She uses different types of game theoretical arguments when trying to understand the internal power dynamics in the three (or seven if mixed categories) different types of regimes. One of her conclusions is that military regimes (that have a much shorter life-span than the other two categories) tend to break down after internal splits (Geddes:1999:122). Military personnel have an exit-possibility that the other two types of regime-leaders often lack. If they feel a regime change will benefit the military, or if

a continued rule could lead to civil war, they are more likely to negotiate a regime shift than the two other types of leaders. Even if single parties could still exist after some regime breakdowns, their role and benefits are quite different from before the breakdown, and single party leaders subsequently tend to hold power as long as possible. Internal opposition in the party tends to stay within the party instead of breaking out as exclusion will lead to loss of all prior benefits. An exclusion from a personalist regime is even more costly, and could lead to exile or even assassination. As a general rule, Geddes finds that (Geddes:1999:122) single party regimes tend to fall after violent overthrows and not internal splits. The same could be said about personalist regimes. So if looking for possible regime weaknesses one should look for internal plotters in military regimes and of outside shocks/uprisings in the other two types of regimes.

### 3.2.2. The effect of economy on regime breakdown

Economy is a far ranging term, and hundreds of statistics are available to measure different kinds of economical issues. I will primarily use the indicators of Brownlee (2009), simply as changes in GDP per capita. Teorell/Hadenius (2007), Brownlee (2009) and Geddes (1999) all find strong correlations between economical recessions and regime breakdown. However, I find the use of GDP per capita too simplistic when trying to understand the effect of economics on regime breakdown on a national level and will therefore also try to see if other types of economical measurements like distribution of wealth, literacy rates, price rises and unemployment rates would be a better measure for economic change affecting the regime breakdowns in the two case countries.

Economy is considered both as a long term and a triggering cause of regime breakdown. The logic behind classifying it as a triggering variable in addition to the long-term one is the idea that accumulated frustration from a skewed economy and lack of distribution of wealth in the long term lead to a high level of discontent, finally exploding in January/February this year. Some economic factors, like price changes do have an almost instant effect, and has a notorious history for creating uprisings in the region. Other economic figures are indicators with medium and long term effects, like reductions in the GDP per capita and unemployment rates for instance.

### 3.2.3. The effect of liberalizing past on regime breakdown

The third variable is that of a liberalizing past. It is always more difficult to loose something you've had than something you'd never had, so the expected connection between regime breakdowns and liberalized past is the more the country liberalized before, the stronger the effect on regime breakdown. When a people have experienced civil liberties the regime must use different kinds of power techniques to survive in times of national crises. In addition to coercion, co-opting former free organizations are one of the techniques to suppress formerly legal or accepted opposition (see for instance Albrecht/Wegner:2006); others are interdiction of meetings and limiting their contacts with foreign individuals. Another used technique is creating parallel organizations and taking over the members of the original organization. The most dangerous organizations (most often islamist and human rights organizations) are either outlawed or prevented from doing any kind of work.

In any case, liberalizations open the road for all types of civil society initiatives,<sup>36</sup> and in possible uprisings, these organizations can easily join forces and strengthen the force of the opposition. If such liberalizations have not been experienced, the uprisings could more easily be suppressed since there will not be anyone leading them. Furthermore, clear demands have to be made to the leadership during uprisings, and civil society organization will be able to express and communicate these demands to the regime.

Brownlee (2009) finds significant correlation for this variable on regime breakdown. The question is however, did liberalizations in the past matter in these two breakdowns since the revolutions were mostly driven by young people? Egypt might seem, at first sight, slightly different due to several protest movement as late as in 2006, while the last liberalizing period in Tunisia was in the late 1980ies. The protests in Egypt in 2006 however did not lead to major liberalizations of the regime policy towards opposition however, quite the contrary. The only credible presidential opposition candidate, Aymen Nour, was imprisoned in this period, a clear sign of the regime continuing crackdown of the opposition. In the end of the 1980ies/start

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<sup>36</sup> Albrecht, Holger and Wegner, Eva (2006) "Autocrats and Islamists: Contenders and containment in Egypt and Morocco" *The Journal of North African Studies*, vol 11, no 2, June 2006, Routledge

1990ies both regimes opened up for some opposition forces to levitate the economic recession, and to transfer some of the waste recourses used to suppress regime-opposition. In any case, this variable is considered to be a long term variable.

### 3.2.4. The effect of diffusion on regime breakdown

The Brinks/Coppedge-model tests the diffusion effect in two stages. The likelihood of government change is tested first and then after having selected out these countries that is prone for change towards or away from democracy, it is tested whether the likelihood of change is tending towards or away from democracy (2006:466). The units used in the analysis are chosen in the first stage, since a selection of all the population would skew the analysis considerably, as most regimes are not primed to change in most years. Like mentioned above, a main assumption in the model is that regimes are rewarded when being or becoming similar to their neighbors, in terms of more trade, peace and security (2006:466).

As mentioned earlier, the definition of diffusion used by Brinks/Coppedge (2006:468) is: “the process by which an innovation communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system”, and it could be applied to several types of social systems, something the authors also encourage (2006:484). In their analysis however, only the regimes are used as unit of analysis.

Identifying the “diffusion networks” is important in the model. Brinks/Coppedge (2006:471) argues that the contiguous neighbors form the primary network when testing countries for diffusion, something that only includes the neighboring countries. However, I think that the diffusion effect from the Arab world would be interesting to look at for our two cases. Even if the internal trade within the Arab world network is not considerable, the common language, history and religion make out an important base for internal relations. The Arab league is another reason for looking at the Arab world as a diffusion network. As I have already selected a number of countries in the Arab world I will continue with the same selection when analyzing diffusion, even if it does not include all of the Arab countries.

I would argue that throughout the years, negative diffusion (away from democracy rather than



towards) has been a major reason for the Arab regimes not to move in democratic direction. Democratic, or at least liberalizing changes has been experienced in both Egypt and Tunisia, as mentioned in under the regime variables, but the regimes have always turned back again towards more authoritarianism. If the model is correct, the regimes would receive rewards for sticking within the autocratic level of their neighbors, at least if one considers that the Arab world does form an important network for the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes. As several networks of diffusion often exist, conflicting diffusion often manifests itself. Diffusion from the network presenting the largest reward will mostly be the most important one. I will try to use the terminology of Brinks/Coppedge to build upon this argument in a qualitative manner.

At this point in time it is not possible to measure a diffusion effect by using the Brinks/Coppedge model for the Tunisian regime change on Egypt since the model is using lagged Freedom House scores (one year lag). The current diffusion effect from Tunisia to Egypt, or in any other type or direction of diffusion, will not be possible to measure statistically therefore until a few years time. And even with statistics present, it will cause a major problem as the diffusion between Tunisia and Egypt happened so quickly. To gain statistical evidence, the diffusion could not happen in the same year if I've understood the BC-model correctly. Freedom House scores are available on a yearly basis, not monthly. So it is perhaps worth the effort at this time in history, to make a quantitative argument to understand the diffusion effects for the two countries, and leave the statistics for later analysis.

The diffusion variable could be important as a triggering variable in the Egyptian case, since the Egyptian contestation started just one week after the Ben Ali regime fell. Looking back, the fall of the Tunisian tyrant seemed quite swift. Friday the 14th was one of the first days of large country-wide demonstrations. That same evening, Ben Ali took off on an air-plane to Saudi Arabia, leaving his prime minister in charge. Blood had been spilt, certainly, but for most Arabs it seemed a small price to pay to get rid of an aging dictator. In the start of the Egyptian demonstrations, Tunisian flags was seen aside the Egyptian ones, and even one of the main slogans used in Tunisia; "degage", a French word that means something like go away, was used by the Arab and English-speaking Egyptians.

Brinks/Coppedge (2006)<sup>37</sup> studied diffusion on a quantitative level in the so called third wave of democracy, and their analysis suggests strong correlation of a regime's level of democracy with their neighboring countries level, this would certainly also be the case in the Arab world until recent happenings. However, the aim here is to understand the diffusion effect possibly aiding the breakdowns, not the former diffusion effect possibly aiding the Arab regimes to stick together in their authoritarian region.

The variable will be considered as a one of very short term in the case of Egypt, from the beginning of the demonstrations up until the day Mubarak left Cairo. However, by specifying the type of diffusion channel more carefully, diffusion will also be considered a long term variable in both of the countries.

#### 3.2.4.1 Diffusion Channel: Social Medias/Al Jazeera

As part of the diffusion variable, as one channel of diffusion, the influence of the social Medias and network TV-stations (especially that of Al Jazeera) are analyzed. Information on social and political happenings in the country was very difficult to access, and the last few years the way to turn was to internet proxies giving access to YouTube, or to Al Jazeera. Tunisia actually closed their embassy in Qatar due du controversies with Al Jazeera, this is possibly the first time in history an embassy was closed due to a television program, quite reveling for the importance of this TV station. It is also evident that Egypt closed off Al Jazeeras Cairo office early on during their uprisings, and also closed access to the channel throughout Egypt. Internet was also shut down, leading the big internet sites to open new service; call and leave your audio-message online. In a poll published in early February this year, the Tunisian Media company Sigma Conseil, as much as 78,4 percent of the interviewed claimed that foreign media had a major importance in the regime breakdown (Sigma:2011)<sup>38</sup>, and 90 percent giving the internet such importance. The diffusion variable is considered both to have a long-term social education effect and a triggering effect on the regime breakdown.

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<sup>37</sup> Brinks, Daniel and Coppedge, Michael (2006) Diffusion Is No Illusion: Neighbor Emulation in the Third Wave of Democracy, *Comparative Political Studies* 2006; 39; 463

<sup>38</sup> Sigma Conseil, (2011) a poll published 5th of February 2011 named "Sondage d'opinion post 14 Janvier 2011" see [www.sigmaconseil.com](http://www.sigmaconseil.com)

### 3.2.4.2. Blocked Diffusion

The type of diffusion via social networks and TV channels like Al Jazeera cannot be measured by changing Freedom House scores, as the civil liberties and political rights mostly stayed the same since the 1990ies. This does not mean that a real diffusion of ideas and attitudes did take place; the problem is that it is not measurable as the diffusion was blocked by government censorship and lack of basic human rights. Extensive field-work and interviews could be a good way to analyze blocked diffusion, but due the time-limits, it will not be done in this analysis.

### 3.2.5. The role of the military in regime breakdowns

The fifth variable is the role of the military in both countries. It is obvious that the Egyptian military would have a major effect in such happenings, being the largest military power in the region. Mubarak was also a military general before Sadat brought him in as a vice president, and the Egyptian regime is categorized as a single party military personalist regime. Even with this difference in mind, there are many similarities between the two countries concerning the militaries behavior during the uprisings, in Tunisia they never wounded or shot any demonstrators, and their role in Egypt was similar, with a few exceptions. The Tunisian military was a small professional force, never being visible in the landscape. Ben Ali, himself with military background, feared the military and kept it at a minimum, instead building up different types of police forces and also his own large presidential guard. To understand the role of the military, some game theoretical arguments will be used (mostly from Geddes (1999)), but the basis of the analysis will still be that of the comparative historical method, with statistics on the size of the military as a basis. The game theoretic arguments will be used to try to analyze the military's response to the uprisings, but the background of their actions will have understood in the light of relevant institutions. I will mainly look at their presence during the demonstrations, so this variable will be considered as a short-term one.

The relations to be tested are the following;

H1: Economy was the single most important short term and long term cause of the regime

breakdowns

H2: Changes in distribution of wealth is more correlated to regime breakdown than a change in GDP per capita.

H3: The introduction of democratic institutions (hybridness) has had prolonging effect on both regimes

H4: Liberalizing past has only minor effect in the starting of the uprising in Tunisia, but could have had some effect when pushing the middle class and professionals to join the demonstrations at a later stage for the case of Tunisia. The effect could have been of more importance in the Egyptian case.

H5: The military played key roles in both regime breakdowns.

H6: The social medias and network TV news stations played a major long-term role as a diffusion channel in feeding the general public with real information, and hereby helped to increase the gap between the government feed information, creating higher level of discontent in the public in general. In the short run it provided vital information about demonstrations and dangers in general.

As mentioned earlier the aim is to either confirm, to deepen or to refute some of the generalizations made in the field of regime breakdowns the last few years. Where possible, the wish is to use as much statistical world-wide available material as possible, to make the analysis transparent and easy to test.

Otherwise, it is important to remember that these are only two cases, while the large N-studies contain as much as 158 regimes. But it is possible that even small case studies can help to improve the analyzing categories and even to question the general observations.

## 4. Applied Method

### 4.1 The Comparative historical method

In this analysis the aim is not to make new general theories, but rather to test out already established theories and possibly come up with some improvements when testing new cases to the already statistically tested variables for regime breakdowns. A few new variables are added; one is specific for the countries (role of the military) as is the blocked diffusion-variable. As Goldstone puts it (in Mahoney/Rueschmeyer:2003:46); “what the comparative historical analysis (CHA) generally undertakes is the study of a single case or a small number of cases in order to test (or possibly shake) strong prior beliefs”.

Generally, two techniques are used in this kind of studies, either process tracing or congruence testing. According to Goldstone (in Mahoney/Rueschmeyer:2003:47), process tracing consists of “analyzing a case into a sequence of events and showing how those events are plausibly linked given the interests and situations faced by groups or individual actors”. This type of analysis is fitting very well to analyze the short-term variables; military, economic deprivation, diffusion and social medias/news network channels.

On the other hand, congruence testing can be used to trace common patterns (in Mahoney/Rueschmeyer:2003:50). But again, large generalizations are not the aim, rather the analysis is used to “challenge and improve our understanding of how particular cases of interest are related or different”. So by comparing the two cases to each other and then to the established theoretical assumptions, the result may have the following effect on the established theory; it may reinforce the theory by proving the already outlined correlations, it may alter them, or it might bring some clarifications to the way the variables should be tested.

Comparative historical analysis is not, as claimed by some rational choice theoreticians, allergic to actors choices, it just tries to see their actions in light of the institutions and structures of which they are part of.

For the comparative part itself, Mills method of agreement is used in the first step of the comparison (see for instance Skocpol:1979:36)<sup>39</sup> as the two case countries are studied. This method analyses a common phenomenon in several cases where most of the explanation variables also are common. According to Skocpol (1979) the so-called method of difference is more powerful, and I therefore add other cases in the region where the dependent variable (regime breakdown) is absent. It might be a risky move, as most of the countries in the region are currently experiencing severe popular uprisings, and many of them are likely to experience regime breakdowns in the near future. To find out if there really is a Middle Eastern exceptionalism, it is interesting to include the near lying countries in the analysis, in my view.

The countries chosen are Syria, Jordan, Algeria and Morocco. They are chosen after the following criteria, 1. Income group (GDP per capita similar to those of Egypt and Tunisia) and 2. Non-oil rich countries, as the internal dynamics tend to differ from the rest of the region, so Algeria was a border-case here, but was chosen as the country has an infrastructural similarity to the rest of the countries, and also a GDP per capita similar to the rest of the countries.

## 4.2 Measuring the variables

### 4.2.1 Dependent variable, Regime Breakdown

Regime breakdown is measured the same way Brownlee (2009:522) does, as “when the incumbent rulers are ousted from power, whether through revolution, coup, electoral defeat, or other means”. The measurement does not consider what might happen after the breakdown, for instance if the ruler or any of his allies return to power.

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<sup>39</sup> Skocpol, Theda, 1979, *States and social revolutions, a comparative analysis of France, Russia and China*, Cambridge University Press

## 4.2.2. Independent variable nr 1: Economy

Several indicators are used in an effort to find the best one for the two case countries and for the selected countries as such. As I had previous knowledge that the GDP per capita did not show remarkable changes the last years for the two cases, it was important to see which indicator could have a stronger explanatory power since all prior research on regime breakdown confirms the importance of economical factors. To cover the latest decades I have chosen to site numbers from the years 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2009 (this is the last number available), if not otherwise stated. Most of the data is drawn from the World Bank database<sup>40</sup>. The chosen countries apart from Egypt and Tunisia are Algeria, Jordan, Morocco and Jordan.

### 4.2.2.1 GDP per capita

The gross domestic product per capita is perhaps the mostly used economic indicator. It is available for all of the world countries on an annual basis. I have chosen not to use the GDP growth rate as an indicator for comparison as it does not consider the different population growth rates of the region.

### 4.2.2.2. GNI based on purchasing power parity per capita

The gross national income based on purchasing power parity per capita is closely related to the GDP per capita, but weighs out the differences of a series of products in local prizes. Food and basic consumer articles have different prizes in different countries, and this index can be used instead of the GDP per capita.

### 4.2.2.3 Consumer price index

This index is recording an average of price changes on a selected number of consumer products with a certain year as a basis. In my index 2005 is the basis year and is therefore counted as 100. Unlike the other tables, the years chosen here are the years following the basis year, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009. Changes in the prices normally have instant effects and I therefore chose the last

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<sup>40</sup> See the site [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)

few years as a basis here instead of every 5 years from 1990 like the other indicators. The world average figure is noted in the table for the sake of comparison.

#### 4.2.2.4 Income distribution

I have used two different measures to analyze income distribution; the first table is that of how many percent of income is held by the 20 percent upper level of population. I would have liked to use more fine measures, like the 10 percent upper level, but since numbers were not available for one of the case countries (Tunisia) in this statistics, I chose to exclude this measure. To get a more comprehensive knowledge about the distribution, I have also included the percent of income held by the 20 percent lower part of the population. The weakness with both of the tables is that no countries have numbers for all of the years. I have decided to add the figures where I find them even if they do not represent the exact year stated. If a year deviates from the one mentioned in the heading (1990/1995/2000/2005/2009) the year is stated after the number inside the table.

#### 4.2.2.5. Unemployment rates

I have chosen to use two indicators for unemployment, both the unemployment rate in percent of total labor force and the youth unemployment rate in percent of labor force of 15-24 years. Since there are not numbers for all of the years in the tables for all of the countries, the closest year is used where available. It is not the same year as mentioned in the heading (1990/1995/2000/2005/2009) the year is mentioned after the number in the table. The power of the comparison is weakened by the lacking numbers for some countries.

#### 4.2.2.6 Population growth

The figures are population growth in percent of total population. Syria has no numbers in this statistics. A low population growth is normally a sign of an advanced economy, as all developed countries has low population growth rates. It also has an effect on growth in GDP, as high population growth “eats” up the GDP growth rates because the GDP has to be divided on a larger



population.

#### 4.2.2.7 Literacy rates

Literacy rates are measured as percent of ages of 15 and above. I have used the adult total numbers, but many countries have missing numbers. As usual, the year not corresponding with the heading is mentioned after the number in the table. Due to the missing data, the comparable power is weakened.

#### 4.2.2.8 Corruption percentiles

The transparency corruption percentiles are used to measure corruption. They are covering most of the world countries and are easily available online. The percentiles will be used both under the economic and the regime variable as a sign of strength of informal economy and institutions. Score 10 signalizes the least corrupt, and 0 the most corrupt level. I use yearly numbers from 2001-2010 as earlier numbers are not available for most of the selected countries. The figures will be compared internally for each country, to see if corruption levels have increased or decreased the last few years. Increased numbers could cause major discontentment in the population and thus having influenced willingness to participate in the uprisings. If all the countries have seen an increase however, the argument would not be strong, as the other countries have not experienced regime breakdown.

#### 4.2.2.9 Percentage of rural population with access to improved water source

The only measurement I found for rural development with numbers for all countries was the percentage of rural population with access to improved water source. Though water is an important indicator for development, the range of the arguments using these figures is limited. I added the world average for the sake of comparison.

### 4.2.3. Independent variable nr 2: Regime characteristics

As mentioned earlier I use two different ways of classifying authoritarian regimes; according to hybridness and to power base.

#### 4.2.3.1 Regime hybridness

There are several ways of measuring regime hybridness, but in this analysis, I find Brownlee's categorization (2009:523-4) the best as it measures only political institutions by using the World Banks database of political institutions (the so-called DPI). The index contains large number of data for most of the world's countries, and only the 7-point indices of legislative and executive electoral competitiveness (called Liec index later on) will be used here. The index is built up in seven steps after the following categorization:

1 = no legislature,

2 = unelected legislature/executive,

3 = elected legislature/executive, one candidate/post,

4 = one party, multiple candidates,

5 = multiple parties are legal but only one party won seats,

6 = multiple parties did win seats but the largest party received more than 75percent of the seats,

7=largest party got less than 75percent.

Furthermore, Brownlee defines his three different categories of hybrid regimes in the following fashion: Closed authoritarian system has if the regime has the numbers 1 to 4, hegemonic authoritarian regime if it has the numbers from 5 to 6 and finally competitive authoritarian system if it has the number 7 in the index. I categorize all the selected Arabic countries according to Brownlee's criteria.

#### 4.2.3.2 Regime power base

As the hybrid-type of definition does not cover all interesting characteristics about authoritarian regimes, I will also use the Geddes (1999) categorizations. Contrary to Brownlee, her types of definition demands a quite high qualitative knowledge about the regimes categorized. Since my analysis is on a small N level, this type of categorization does not pose major problems. On a large N-level however this is not the case, and if the categories are to be used on a world basis, they should be made mutually exclusive and easier to use. The same group of selected Arabic countries will be categorized.

Geddes criteria for classification (Geddes:1999a)<sup>41</sup> are rather complex, and only the ones in interest of this study will be referred to here. She uses the following characteristics to identify regimes:

“Military regimes were defined as those governed by an officer or retired officer, with the support of the military establishment and some routine mechanism for high level officers to influence policy choice and appointments. Single-party regimes were defined as regimes in which the party has some influence over policy, controls most access to political power and government jobs, and has functioning local-level organizations. Regimes were considered personalist if the leader, who usually came to power as an officer in a military coup or as the leader of a single-party government, had consolidated control over policy and recruitment in his own hands, in the process marginalizing other officers' influence and/or reducing the influence and functions of the party. In the real world, many regimes have characteristics of more than one regime type. When regimes had important characteristics of more than one pure regime type, especially when the area specialist literature contained disagreements about the importance of military and party institutions, I put them in hybrid categories.”(Geddes:1999a:31).

The hybrid categories she refers to are not the ones I used in the previous chapter, but rather the following; single-party/military, single-party/personalist, single-party/military/personalist,

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<sup>41</sup> Geddes, Barbara, 1999, *Authoritarian Breakdown: Empirical Test of a Game Theoretic Argument*, Paper prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, September 1999.

Military/personalist. These then are added to the three “pure” categories of single-party, personlist and military regime.

#### 4.2.4. Independent variable nr 3: prior liberalizations

Again, I use Brownlee’s (2009:525) very transparent and clear categorization that is as follows: “Regime-years that had received a civil liberty score of 5–7 (basic parameters of Freedom House’s “not free” category) were coded as un-liberalized. Those regime-years with a lower, better rating on civil liberties (1–4) were coded as liberalized”. I primarily discuss the two case countries Tunisia and Egypt, but make a few comparisons with the list of selected countries also to better understand the strength of a possible relationship.

#### 4.2.5 Independent variable nr 4: diffusion

A comparison of both of the Freedom House scores (civil liberties and political rights) will be made for all the Arabic countries. Both of the scores range from 1-7 with 1 as the highest score in terms of freedom and 7 as the lowest. Countries that differ from the rest of the groups will be commented on, but the main comparison will be between the two case countries as they experienced regime breakdown. Three different networks are investigated; the Arab world, neighboring countries and super-power influence. When testing Tunisia, Algeria and Libya are looked at as neighboring countries. A simple average for all the Arabic countries except Tunisia is then calculated for the years 1980 to 2010. Egypt’s neighboring countries are Sudan, Libya and Saudi Arabia (Israel is excluded due to its regional particularity). The average of the Arab countries scores except Egypt is compared with the target country, and finally the Egyptian and the US scores are commented on.

##### 4.2.5.1 Blocked diffusion

The internet users’ rates from the World Bank data base will be used for the selected countries to establish an idea of possible blocked diffusion. Since internet and satellite TV haven’t existed for very long, statistics for the last 20 years will be compared. The main comparison will be between

the two case countries, but remarks and statistics from all of the selected countries will be lined up in the table.

#### 4.2.6 Independent variable nr 5: the military

The strength of the military will be compared by using statistics for all of the chosen Arab countries from the World Bank data base. The figures used are military expenditure in percent of GDP for the years 1990/1995/2000/2005/2009. The world average is added for comparison. I will also look at the armed forced personnel in percent of total labor force, since different levels of development must make it cheaper to have military officers in some countries. The same years and countries will be compared in this table.

#### 4.3. Data

For the theoretical framework a series of research articles on regime breakdowns are used, while the “newness” of the breakdowns makes it difficult to find articles or books describing or analyzing the phenomenon. I therefore draw on newspaper and shorter articles/commentaries by known researchers. The statistical material is taken from well-known databases like the World Bank, Transparency International and Freedom House. I have made several interviews in March/April this year with Tunisian officials and civil society personalities (as part of an official delegation), but since I did not find time to do the same type of interviews for Egypt, I excluded the interviews from the analysis. However, these talks did help me considerably when formulating the research question and when choosing the variables for the analysis. The tables made are simple numerical collections, aimed to be used in the qualitative comparison of the countries.

And now, hopefully to the most interesting part of the essay, the examining of the different variables.

## Analyzing the variables

### 5. Economic variables

Presidential regimes do not possess the cultural and historical legitimacy that most monarchies have, and the Ben Ali/Mubarak regimes had to build their legitimacy mainly on the economic performance of the country. The legitimacy of both the Ben Ali and the Mubarak regime was at a bottom-low in the end of 2010. Adding to the loss of legitimacy was the more and more visual nepotism of the regimes.

Even if the press had a slightly greater room of maneuvering in Egypt, and the Egyptian economy received a large part of its budget in foreign aid, the economical problems bore many similarities to that of Tunisia; regional development only in areas where tourism could be promoted (Sahel in Tunisia, Sharm-el-sheik area in Egypt), lack of investment and productivity in the agricultural sector, high level of corruption and high unemployment also among the educated young.

A number of economical related problems figured in the Medias as explanation the two uprisings, with price rises and youth unemployment as the main triggers. Not many connections between economy and democracy remain unchallenged however. One that seems to survive is that once a country has been through a democratization it is likely to stay a democracy if the GDP per capita is over a certain level (Geddes:1999:117). So if democratic transitions are carried out in Egypt and Tunisia, there are big hopes that the populations of those countries will enjoy democratic rights also in the future, as their GDP-level per capita is grouping both of the countries in the middle income group.

But the question asked below is that of the past; did economics matter in the regime breakdowns, and if the answer is yes, in what ways did it matter, and which is the best manner of measuring “the economic link” to the breakdowns? The most obvious and certainly most applied is that of GDP per capita. I present results from a selected group of Arab countries when choosing the statistics, these are Syria, Jordan, Algeria and Morocco, in addition to Egypt and Tunisia. These

are countries with similar GDP per capita figures, mostly non oil countries in the same region as our two cases.

## 5.1. GDP per capita

In Brownlee’s study on regime breakdown, change in the GDP per capita has a strong correlation with regime breakdown. He says that the result of the analysis is “strengthening the overall impression that non-electoral variables are exerting the greatest influence on the maintenance or collapse of the regimes in question” (Brownlee:2009:526).

Table 1 GDP per capita, in US dollar

<b>Country/year</b>	<b>1990</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2009</b>
<b>Algeria</b>	2454	1478	1796	3115	4029
<b>Egypt</b>	746	942	1423	1162	2270
<b>Jordan</b>	1268	1604	1764	2326	4216
<b>Morocco</b>	1032	1212	1270	1924	2811
<b>Syria</b>	968	780	1170	1494	2474
<b>Tunisia</b>	1507	2013	2033	2888	3792

Data from the World Bank, see [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)

Looking at the two case countries however, both Egypt and Tunisia seemed to manage their economies quite well in the midst of a world recession. Both countries have more than doubled their GDP per capita numbers the last 20 years. Much of the growth has taken place the last five year, something that makes it difficult to use this indicator when explaining the regime breakdowns. Similar figures are shown for the group of “control countries”. After checking if the GNI index gives a similar or different picture, the much commented on changes in consumer price indexes will be looked at.

## 5.2. Gross National income based on PPP index per capita

A quick look at the PPP index (where local consumer prices is calculated into the GDP per capita), our two cases seem even better off. Both of them have seen steady rises in the PPP index the last 20 years, and the Tunisian index has almost tripled from 1990 to 2010 under the Ben Ali governance. The good performance counters the relation between GDP/GNI on regime breakdown and the rest of the countries in the group show similar numbers.

Table 2 Gross National Income (GNI) based on PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) per capita

Country/year	1990	1995	2000	2005	2009
<b>Algeria</b>	4340	4350	5130	6820	8110
<b>Egypt</b>	2240	2780	3570	4310	5680
<b>Jordan</b>	2250	2740	3220	4450	5730
<b>Morocco</b>	1860	2020	2510	3450	4400
<b>Syria</b>	2060	3120	3150	3830	4620
<b>Tunisia</b>	2810	3430	4600	6080	7810

Data from the World Bank, see [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)

## 5.3. Consumer price index

Looking at the changes in the last few years (see table), Tunisia is quite well off compared to the world average. The same could be said about other countries in the region like Algeria and Morocco. It is a weakness however that the statistics stops in 2009. A comparison for 2010 should be interesting, since rises in consumer prices tend to give immediate results historically. Increases in bread prizes have been the main reasons for former uprisings in this region.

Looking at the Egyptian figures however, another story is revealed. Heavy price rises was seen since 2006 and onwards, and the same can be said about a comparable country like Jordan. The average rise is much higher than the world average, and years of such rises must have hit really



hard on the lowest part of the Egyptian population, already living under the poverty level.

Table 3 Consumer price index (where year 2005=100)

<b>Country/year</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>
<b>Algeria</b>	103	106	111	117
<b>Egypt</b>	108	118	139	156
<b>Jordan</b>	106	112	129	128
<b>Morocco</b>	103	105	109	110
<b>Syria</b>	110	114	132	136
<b>Tunisia</b>	104	108	113	117
<b>World average</b>	104	109	119	122

Data from the World Bank, see [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)

With a GNP per capita much lower than that of Tunisia for instance (see table earlier), the poor of Egypt must have become much poorer the last few years, a factor that could have pushed people to participate in the demonstrations of January-February this year. Morocco and Algeria however is approximately as well off as Tunisia with figures under the world average in 2009.

## 5.4. Distribution of wealth

Many years are missing in the statistics, but within that selection of those Arab countries Tunisia does differ somewhat. With no figures for the upper 10 percent statistics, I compared first the upper 20 percent the population and their share of national income (see table). The biggest difference between Tunisia and Egypt are found in the end of the 80ies/beginning of the 90ies. At that time Tunisia's upper 20 percent of the population consumed 50 percent of its income. The number for Egypt, at the other side of the curve, was at 40 percent, and the rest of the comparable Arab countries found themselves in between these two figures. The difference has been relaxed somewhat the last twenty years, with the last figure from Tunisia in 2000 at 47 percent, and Egypt the same year at 42 percent. Morocco matched Tunisia in 2001 with its 47

percent.

Table 4 Income distribution, percent of income held by the 20 percent upper level of population

Country/year	1990	1995	2000	2005	2009
<b>Algeria</b>	47,2 (1988)	42,5	n.a	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Egypt</b>	40,8 (1991)	39,9 (1996)	42,1	41,5	n.a.
<b>Jordan</b>	43,5 (1987)	44,2 (1997)	n.a.	45,7 (2003)	45,4 (2006)
<b>Morocco</b>	46,4 (1991)	n.a.	46,2 (1999)	n.a	n.a
<b>Syria</b>	n.a	n.a.	n.a.	43,9 (2004)	47,9 (2007)
<b>Tunisia</b>	46,3	47,5	47,2	n.a.	n.a.

Data from the World Bank, see [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)

Looking then at the lowest 20 percent of population, the figures are reversed. Tunisia's poorest 20 percent receives from 5,5 to 5,9 percent of the national income the last 20 years, whereas their Egyptian counterparts receives between 8 to 9 percent of the national income. Again, the rest of the compared countries find themselves in between these figures, on the 6 or 7 percentile.

Table 5 Income distribution, percent held by the 20 percent lower part of the population

Country/year	1990	1995	2000	2005	2009
<b>Algeria</b>	6,5 (1988)	6,9	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Egypt</b>	8,6 (1991)	9,5 (1996)	9,0	9,0	n.a.
<b>Jordan</b>	7,2 (1987)	5,9 (1992)	7,5 (1997)	6,6 (2003)	7,2 (2006)
<b>Morocco</b>	6,6 (1991)	n.a.	6,4 (1999)	6,3 (2001)	6,5 (2007)
<b>Syria</b>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	7,7 (2004)	n.a.
<b>Tunisia</b>	5,9	5,6	5,9	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Chile</b>	3,4	3,5 (1996)	3,5	3,7 (2003)	4,1 (2006)

Data from the World Bank, see [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)

Combined with other figures then, the distribution of wealth could have had an impact in the Tunisian uprisings, but probably not so in the Egyptian ones where income is more equally distributed.

## 5.5. Unemployment figures

Apart from the consumer prices, unemployment figures have been used as a main explanation for the uprisings in the international Medias. Looking at our selection of Arab countries, we see that most countries have large fluctuations in the general unemployment rates, except for Tunisia that has experienced a steady, relatively high rate of 14 to 15 percent the last 20 years. A country like Algeria had extreme figures at 30 percent in 2000, but it fell to 12 percent in 2006. Morocco also experienced a record high rate of 19 percent in 1989, but settled at 10 percent in 2009. For Egypt the 2008 rate was at 8,7 percent.

Table 6 Unemployment rate, total in percent of total labor force

Country/year	1990	1995	2000	2005	2009
<b>Algeria</b>	19,8	27,9	29,8	15,3	11,3 (2008)
<b>Egypt</b>	n.a.	9,0 (1996)	9,0	11,2	9,4
<b>Jordan</b>	n.a.	14,6	15,8 (2001)	12,4 (2004)	12,9
<b>Morocco</b>	15,8	22,9	13,6	11	10
<b>Syria</b>	5,8 (1989)	7,2	2,3	10,4 (2003)	8,4 (2007)
<b>Tunisia</b>	n.a.	15,9 (1997)	15,7	14,2	14,2 (2008)

Data from the World Bank, see [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)

Again, Tunisia differs from the rest of the group by being the country with the highest total unemployment rate the last decade. A similar picture is shown for the youth unemployment figures (see table). Statistics are difficult to compare due to lacking figures for many years, but after extreme years for Morocco in 1998 with a 35 percent youth unemployment rate, and Egypt in 2005 (34 percent), Egypt has a lowered rate at 24,8 percent in 2007, Morocco with 21,9 percent in 2009 and Jordan with 27 percent in 2009. Even with the latest noted figure as far back

as 2005, Tunisia lies on a steady 31 to 32 percent from the 1990ies.

Table 7 Unemployment rate, youth (15-24 years) total, in percent of total labor forces ages 15-24 years

Country/year	1990	1995	2000	2005	2009
<b>Algeria</b>	n.a.	n.a.	47,8 (2001)	31,1	24,3 (2006)
<b>Egypt</b>	n.a.	n.a.	23,1 (1998)	34,1	24,8 (2007)
<b>Jordan</b>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	28,3 (2007)	27
<b>Morocco</b>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Syria</b>	9,4 (1984)	n.a.	26,3 (2002)	19,5 (2003)	19,1 (2007)
<b>Tunisia</b>	30,8 (1989)	31,9 (1997)	n.a.	30,7	n.a.

Data from the World Bank, see [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)

Like for the income distribution statistics, it is likely that high unemployment rates did matter in the Tunisian uprisings, but less so in the Egyptian ones.

## 5.6. Population growth rates

Table 8 Population growth in percent of total

Country/year	1990	1995	2000	2005	2009
<b>Algeria</b>	2,5	1,9	1,4	1,5	1,5
<b>Egypt</b>	2,4	1,9	1,9	1,9	1,8
<b>Jordan</b>	3,7	3,3	2,5	2,3	2,4
<b>Morocco</b>	1,9	1,5	1,2	1,1	1,2
<b>Syria</b>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Tunisia</b>	2,4	1,6	1,1	1,0	1,0
<b>World average</b>	1,7	1,5	1,3	1,2	1,2

Data from the World Bank, see [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)

Population growth rates are closely related to employment, and as seen in the table, Tunisia's

population growth rate has been well under the world average for decades (at 1 percent in 2009), while the Egyptian rate has been reduced since 1990, but maintains a rather high level as such, at 1,8 percent as the latest figure. Even with many more entering the labor market every year, the Egyptian government has managed to keep its unemployment level lower than similar countries, and the high Tunisian figure is becoming even more paradoxical with the low population growth in mind. Jordan is another extreme case with very high level of population growth but at the same time with an unemployment rate lower than the Tunisian one.

## 5.7. Literacy rates

Jordan's literacy rates has been the highest in the region for decades with its literacy rate of 92 percent in 2007, and Tunisia follows with 77 percent in 2008. Egypt, with its huge population, had a rate of 66,4 percent in 2006. When figures are available however, the entire region finds itself below the world average in literacy, with Jordan as an exception with its high rates. Education level is closely connected to development, and one reason for the lack of high technology industry in the region. To keep up the continuing high growth rates it is essential that the education and literacy level in the whole region increase substantially to catch up with the global level.

Table 9 Literacy rates, adult total in percent of ages 15 and above

Country/year	1990	1995	2000	2005	2009
<b>Algeria</b>	49,6 (1987)	n.a.	69,9 (2002)	72,6 (2006)	n.a.
<b>Egypt</b>	44,4 (1986)	55,6 (1996)	n.a.	71,4	n.a.
<b>Jordan</b>	n.a.	n.a.	89,9 (2003)	92,2 (2007)	n.a.
<b>Morocco</b>	n.a.	41,6 (1994)	n.a.	52,3 (2004)	56,1
<b>Syria</b>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Tunisia</b>	48,2 (84)	n.a.	n.a.	74,3 (2004)	77,6 (2008)
<b>World average</b>	75,6	n.a.	81,6	n.a.	83,7

Data from the World Bank, see [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)

## 5.8. Informal economy

As I generally try to use worldwide available statistics to make future comparisons possible, I'll take a look at the corruption percentiles for the selected group of countries, as corruption can be an indicator of informal economy.

As seen in the table, it is difficult to draw strong conclusions from the index results. Tunisia and Jordan are generally the best off in the group, Egypt and Syria the worst, and Algeria and Morocco are in between those two groups. When looking at the internal changes, both Tunisia and Jordan had better scores in 2004-5 than in 2010, the same can be said about Syria. Both Algeria and Morocco have seen a steady curve of changes, while the Egyptian figures were at its lowest in 2008-9. With one of the best figures of the countries, the level of corruption in Tunisia cannot then be used a strong indicator accelerating the regime breakdown. It is possible that corruption did play a role in the Egyptian uprisings, but probably as one of many factors. The corruption level in the Arab region is generally higher than that of Northern Europe, but on the same level as the Southern and Eastern European region.

Table 10 Corruption percentiles, where score 10 signalizes the least corrupt, and 0 the most corrupt

Country/year	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
<b>Algeria</b>	n.a.	n.a.	2,6	2,7	2,8	3,1	3,0	3,2	2,8	2,9
<b>Egypt</b>	3,6	3,4	3,3	3,2	3,4	3,3	2,9	2,8	2,8	3,1
<b>Jordan</b>	4,9	4,5	4,6	5,3	5,7	5,3	4,7	5,1	5,0	4,7
<b>Morocco</b>	n.a.	3,7	3,3	3,2	3,2	3,2	3,5	3,5	3,3	3,4
<b>Syria</b>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	3,4	3,4	2,0	2,4	2,1	2,6	2,5
<b>Tunisia</b>	5,3	4,8	4,9	5,0	4,9	4,6	4,2	4,4	4,2	4,3

All data from transparency, [www.transparency.com](http://www.transparency.com)

## 5.9. Conclusive remarks on the economic indicators

The different economic indicators did not give a clear picture of the importance of economics in the uprisings. It did however show that the GDP per capita indicator could not have been used as a sole indicator to explain the happenings in Egypt and Tunisia. The single factors giving some hope of explanatory force were also different for the two countries, as the high employment rate, also for youths, was strong in Tunisia, but not so much in Egypt. As for the population growth figures, these would have increased the economical problems in Egypt, but produced a positive effect on the Tunisian economy with its low level. Consumer price rises are important in the case of Egypt, but not so in Tunisia, with rises well below the world average. Corruption figures did show a certain increase of corruption in the two case countries the last few years, but the changes were not bigger than the other countries in the selected group. The income distribution of Tunisia could have played a role as a push factor for the uprisings, especially when these are added to by the more and more visible nepotism of the ruling elite. The same cannot be said for Egypt, with a much more equal income distribution.

## 6. Regime variables

As mentioned in the theoretical chapter, Brownlee (2009) finds no correlation of presence of democratic institutions in authoritarian states on regime breakdown, or on what is often referred to as regime hybridness. Since authoritarian regimes differ greatly within their own group, it is interesting to find out if there are particular characteristics of these regimes that are connected with a breakdown of the regime, or if other non-regime variables play the main role.

Since our two states are only in the beginning of their transitions, this relation between regime type and probability for democratic transition will not be discussed at this point in time. A slightly different connection will be discussed however, that of the power base of the regime, an issue dealt with in Geddes (1999), Brownlee (2009) and Teorell&Hadenius (2006). All of their studies show that regimes with different power bases have different length of survival. I will use their information to see if it has any explanatory effect on the regime breakdowns in Egypt and Tunisia. Geddes (1999) has a very interesting set of game theoretical arguments explaining the

internal logics of the different sets of regimes, and the hope is that her insight will shed light on the Egyptian and Tunisian breakdowns.

## 6.1. Regime power base

Geddes study mention several characteristics of a regimes power base, military, personalist and one-party and then mixing these in different ways to understand which type of regime that has the longest survival rate. Her study shows that the personalist is the longest survivor followed by the one-party regime and finally the military regimes.

Looking at regime survival rate for the two case countries, the Mubarak regime lasted almost 30 years and Ben Ali's 23 years. Looking at Geddes averages reveals a strange coincidence, as Egypt would be categorized under single-party-military-personal regime with a average durability of 31 years, and Tunisia under single-party regime with an average durability of 22,7 years (Geddes:1999:133). This categorization is confirmed by Jason Brownlee's article (2009).

Both Mubarak and Ben Ali were at the end of their regimes in late 2010, both having severe health problems due to age. The fear in Egypt and Tunisia was that their sons or possibly son-in-law would take over the presidencies, and therefore continue on the same authoritarian road as their family members. Both Gamal Mubarak (Stacher:2008)<sup>42</sup> and Sakhr El Matri (son in law of Ben Ali) had been elected members of parliament and were at the same time seeing extreme success as business-men in their countries.

I would however argue that the Tunisian regime of 2010 also bore characteristics of a personalist regime-type. This trait was perhaps not so visible before the year 2000, and that is perhaps the reason why it is only categorized as a single-party regime. Some commentators claim that a "coup d'état" slowly was experienced in the early 1990ies, when the new wife of Ben Ali, Leila Trabelsi, started to form her own clique and making most of the decisions since the president went through periods of absence due to cancer. There must have been fractions in the RCD party, where a part supported the Ben Ali/Leila line, and other certainly was aiming at establishing the

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<sup>42</sup> Stacher, Joshua (2008) "Egypt, the Anatomy of Sucession" in Review of African Political Economy no 116:301-314, ROAPE Publications Ltd.



full power of the party, with clearer power-sharing features than when having a more obscure personalist clique ruling. Leila Ben Ali, who is said to have been a hair-dresser, took on more and more official tasks, and her family, the Trabelsi's, became more and more involved in all major sectors in the Tunisian society. Members of this inner clique did not pay either taxes, customs, telephone-bills and all other state-held services. Having come from a poor neighborhood in the Tunisian capital, the Trabelsi and Ben Ali families divided already established companies between them. One of the biggest banks in Tunisia was taken over by Belhassen Trabelsi (Leyla's brother) for one dinar.

The last few years before the regime breakdown, the son-in-law of Ben Ali and Leila, Sakhr el Matri was also establishing his own business empire and at the same time occupying political positions in the parliament. Coming from an established political family, stressing Islamic values, the regime surely hoped that El Matri would be a better candidate than the uneducated nepotist Trabelsi clan.

A further proof at the personalist touch of the regime was that the internal party recruitment to positions like mayors and governors were overseen and instead went to family members or close friends of the Ben Ali clique, something that certainly must have increased the internal opposition in the party towards the ruling family. This opposition was naturally never expressed outside the walls of the party headquarters.

Ben Ali was a military officer himself, something that could have given the military more importance than under the Bourguiba regime. Bourguiba was a great skeptic of military power and the coup attempts that often follow these types of regimes, and Ben Ali actually followed the same tactic of Bourguiba in this matter. Ben Ali was not himself a high-ranking officer, having advanced more due to marriage to the daughter of General Kefi, than to a professional career. Before marrying Naima Kefi, Ben Ali was the driver of the General, and he had just primary education. He did not stay long in the military however, and quickly pursued a civil career. He had several positions before becoming minister of interior and later prime minister for Bourguiba in 1988. He took the power in a bloodless coup in 1987 by declaring the former president senile, a claim supported by seven doctors that apparently had examined the aging president. Since there

was no Vice President in the Tunisian system, the P.M. was the most powerful politician after the President himself.

Instead of increasing the already minimal importance of the military in the Tunisian society, Ben Ali built up a large police force and a presidential guard. Military officers stayed in their barracks and had small possibilities for a civil career. Tunisia is in fact called the Costa Rica of the Middle East due to the small importance of their military.

The situation in Egypt is possibly even more complex, with the classification of the country as a military, single-party, personalist regime. The regime bears characteristics of all the Geddes types,- it is a single party regime where the military is of major importance inside the power clique of the country, and with a president forming a type of ruling clique with his family members and friends, giving the regime a personalist trait. The last few years Gamal Mubarak, after having been seen as a successful business man, served in parliament, and also occupied high positions in the National Democratic Party for several years. Like in Tunisia, opposition internally in the NDP did exist, but like in most single party regimes, the pay-off for staying inside the party, even as an internal opposition group was much better than being excluded.

Geddes (1999a:17) uses the game of the stag hunt to understand the power structure and the actions of members of a single party regime. In this game everyone's help and cooperation is needed to kill the prey. In such regimes, it's in all the party members' interest to keep the ruler in power as long as possible, and co-optation of opposition is more frequent than exclusion.

Geddes (1999:122/134) claims that both single party and personalist regimes are less likely to fall after internal splits (like military regimes), but rather by violent uprisings and outside events. The internal struggles that naturally exist also in single party and personalist regimes are resolved either by exclusion of the internal opposition (something that could be very risky especially in personalist regimes) or cooption of outside opposition. Military officers are generally more concerned with the faith of the military itself than keeping the power, and are therefore more likely to go through negotiated regime changes than the single-party and especially the personalist type of regimes Geddes (1999:126). With the fall of the Mubarak regime, the military took the power, with assurance of a democratic development and their

retirement from office as soon as civil government was elected. And as Geddes model predicted both of the regimes fell due to social uprisings.

Absence of external shocks is a similarity in both breakdowns. Even if the Mubarak regime (and all the other Arab regimes in these troubled days) blamed the uprisings on islamists in general, and on Al Qaida in particular, it is generally agreed upon that outside forces did not play an important role in neither the Tunisian nor the Egyptian uprisings.

Before the term of hybrid regime type was in use, neo-patrimonialism was used as a term with a similar meaning. Neopatrimonialist regimes are defined by Bratton and Van der Walle (1997) as: “those hybrid regimes in which the customs and patterns or patrimonialism co-exist with, and suffuse, rational-legal institutions” (Bratton& van de Walle 1997: 62). The updated definition of the concept is found in Erdman/Engel (2006,p. 18): Neo-patrimonialism is a mixture of two, partly interwoven, types of domination that co-exist: namely, patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic domination. Van der Walle’s study is interesting because it makes several generalizations about African regime breakdown, some of the most interesting are (Wan der Walle,1994:9-17)<sup>43</sup>;

- Middle class opposition align with the opposition in transitions from neo-patrimonial regimes
- Political transitions in neo-patrimonial regimes are struggles to establish legal rule
- Elite political pacts are unlikely in neo-patrimonial regimes
- Neo-patrimonial elites fracture over access to patronage
- Political transitions from neo-patrimonial regimes originate in social protest

Even if his regime categorizations differ from that of Geddes, Wan der Walle’s (1994) general observations about African regime breakdown is in accordance with Geddes. When the middle classes joined the protests often started by a poorer layer in the society the possibility of a regime transition would be big. This is exactly what happened in both of the case countries, as trade

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<sup>43</sup> Bratton, Michael and Van der Walle, Nicholas, (1994), Neopatrimonial regimes and transitions in Africa, World Politics, vol 46, no 4, july 1994, p. 453-489

unionists, youth groups and different kinds of underground movement joined the demonstrations in Egypt and Tunisia after poor angry masses had started to demonstrate. As the numbers of demonstrators grew it had an accelerating effect as people started to realize that the regimes simply couldn't imprison hundreds of thousands or in the case of Egypt, millions of demonstrators. Many commentators were also surprised that the much feared Islamic groups did not participate (as a group at least), but found all the demonstrators to gather under the secular slogans demanding rule of law and democracy.

The four other regimes used in the economic chapter are categorized in the following manner: two of them are monarchies (Jordan and Morocco) and the two others are single party regimes where the military play an important role (Algeria and Syria). In all of the other four countries, the military expenditure is higher than in Egypt and Tunisia, something that could push the military to support the regime in case of demonstrations, as it might fear reduced budgets and decrease of their importance in politics in the country by supporting the demonstrators. When the military is strong, it will probably also have a greater believe in its ability to stop the demonstrations, something the Tunisian military probably didn't have. We have already seen the examples from Syria and Algeria where the military is used to crack down on demonstrations. Since they have such a big budget under the current regime, it is possible that they see a regime change as negative for the armed forces. Monarchies are a category Geddes excludes, but it is probable that monarchies could manage a smoother regime change than republics, as the monarchs can stay on as Kings even in a full fledged democracy. Their role will certainly be curtailed economically and politically, but if large uprisings occur, the King could see democratization as the best way out of the crisis.

The regime changes of both Tunisia and Egypt seems to fit the Geddes categories very well, one could in fact have predicted both the way and the approximate downfall of these regimes by using her terminology. The problem with Geddes categories however, is that it demands more work to classify the different countries in her categories than for instance a simple categorization by using Freedom House scores, or polity scores. However, Geddes has already categorized most countries, so further analysis could simply re-use and prolong her data-material if her categories are still seen as fruitful. Another problem is her mixed categories, as many regimes are

considered to have all the three characteristics, reducing the chances of getting clear results when comparing them and correlating them with other variables. The main categorizations of single party/military and personalist might be clear, but since so many regimes are categorized as mixes of these, the picture becomes less clear, and so does the possibility of making generalization by using the categories. Another point made by both Hadenius/Teorell (2006) and Brownlee (2009) is the lacking categorization of monarchies in her model. As an answer to the abundant literature the last ten years on the hybrid regime categories, those three researchers aimed to create an easily accessibly categorization that also reflected these new authoritarian regimes with democratic institutions.

## 6.2. Democratic institutions in authoritarian systems (hybridness)

Teorell and Hadenius (2006(Kellogg):14-15)<sup>44</sup> added the so-called hybrid regimes to their study, and also that of monarchy. They divided the hybrid category into three types, those of dominant party authoritarian regimes, non-dominant party authoritarian and electoral authoritarian regime. They found the life span of the monarchies to be the longest with more than 25 years, followed by the one party regimes (17,8 years), democracy (17,5 years), no party regimes (12,9), military (11,1 years) dominant limited multiparty regimes (5,87 years) and non dominant limited multiparty regimes with 5,87 years.

The result are interesting, but as Brownlee (2009:520) mentions their way to categorize the regimes makes them put the same regime in up to three different categories, reducing the reliability of the analysis. I would also like to argue that the new types of hybrid regimes are a fairly recent type of regimes, while the others are well known regimes having existed for decades. Authoritarian regimes did not have multiparty elections very often before the end of the 1990ies. This newness of their type might explain their low survival rate.

As mentioned in the introduction to this variable, Brownlee (2009:527) did not find robust correlations of hybridity (categorized as either hegemonic or competitive authoritarian) on

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<sup>44</sup> Hadenius, Axel and Teorell, Jan (2006) Authoritarian regimes, Stability, change and pathways to democracy, 1972–2003•, Working Paper #331 - November 2006, <http://nd.edu/~kellogg/publications/workingpapers/WPS/331.pdf>

regime breakdown. Other authors claim that, on the contrary, the introduction of democratic institutions in many Middle Eastern autocracies has prolonged the reign of these regimes, giving them increased legitimacy by marginalizing political opposition(Hochman:2006:3)<sup>45</sup>. Hochman further argues (2006:7) that the reforms incited in the MENA region is carefully selected, and most often does not open the way for real opposition forces. Where this is the case, these reforms are only of temporary nature, when the regimes other type of reforms are not sufficient to maintain the power. Hochman studies three MENA cases exclusively (Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia) and it would be interesting to see how the selected group of countries scores on the index used by Brownlee (2009). Perhaps the categorization could be used to confirm or reject the so-called Middle Eastern exceptionalism. In the table below I've plotted the group of countries used under the economic variable into the Brownlee categories (2009).

Table 11 Coding of the group of selected countries according to the World Bank Database of Political institutions, the Legislative and Executive Indices of Electoral Competitiveness (Brownlee's categories (2009))

Country	Years as Closed authoritarian System (scores 1-4)	Years as Hegemonic authoritarian System (scores 5-6)	Years as Competitive authoritarian system (score 7)
Algeria	1975-89	1990-92	1997-2009
Egypt	1975-76	1980-2009	1977-79
Jordan	1975-92	1993 and 1998-2009	1995-97
Morocco	1975-77	-	1978-2009
Syria	-	1975-91	1992-2009
Tunisia	1975-1981	1982-2009	-

Liec score on the DPI index : No legislature: 1, Unelected legislature: 2, Elected, 1 candidate: 3 and

1 party, multiple candidates: 4, where multiple parties are legal but only one party won seats: 5 and multiple parties did win seats but the largest party received more than 75percent of the seats: 6, where largest party got less than 75percent: 7

<sup>45</sup> Hochman, Dafna (2006) Does Substance Matter? Strategic Reforms in Middle Eastern and North African Autocracies, 1991-1993, Department of Political Science , Columbia University, Paper Presented at Annual Graduate Conference, April 2006

The Legislative and executive indices of Electoral competitiveness (LIEC) scores ranges from 1-7. From then on I use the Brownlee (2009) categorization where

5. Closed authoritarian regimes correspond to a score of 1-4
6. Hegemonic authoritarian regimes correspond to a score of 5-6
7. Competitive authoritarian regimes correspond to a score of 7

I add the same selected countries as under the economic chapter, to possibly be able to find some kind of common pattern. Brownlee (2009) has added a “Middle East” variable to his plot, and finds negative correlation with this variable on the dependent variable of regime breakdown. The logic is that if the country finds itself in the Middle Eastern region, the likeliness of regime breakdown is smaller than the rest of the world.

As seen in the table both Tunisia and Egypt (in addition to Jordan) is categorized as hegemonic authoritarian systems the last ten years. Algeria, Morocco and Syria are categorized as competitive systems at least the last ten years, Morocco as far back as 1978. Even if the selection is not big enough to put the general results of Brownlee in question, the categorization certainly strengthen the idea of Middle Eastern exceptionalism, since it is none of the competitive authoritarian regimes that saw a regime breakdown in the early 2011, but two of the hegemonic authoritarian systems. Instead of following the transitionalists logic by gradually establishing democracy, the Middle Eastern regimes seem to have had a special internal logic unique for this region.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Middle East has remained the only large region in the world that has totally managed to avoid democratization. Without one internal power forcing the others to stick to their authoritarian practices, like the case of Soviet union for the Eastern European countries, it has been difficult to grasp why all of the region has managed to be isolated from the wave of democratizations following the fall of the Berlin wall.

Since it is often Freedom House scores that is used in comparison of democracy/authoritarian regimes (Teorell/Hadenius:2006), I add, in the table below the average Freedom House scores of

the selected countries since 1972. The table gives a different picture of the countries than the DPI index, and this shows the importance of specifying the variables correctly when performing statistical analysis. In my view, the DPI index should be used when wanting to compare characteristics of political institutions (like parliaments/elections/party-systems) and not the Freedom House scores that indicate political and civil rights. This is also the reason why Brownlee (2009) has chosen to use this index to understand hybrid regimes. The DPI index is readily available for all the worlds countries from 1975 and onwards.

Table 12 Average Freedom House scores (10-year intervals) for some selected countries, on a scale from 1-7 where 1 is the highest liberties/rights score and 7 is the lowest liberty/rights score

Years	1972-1980		1981-1990		1991-2000		2001-2010	
Country	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL
Algeria	6	6	5,7	5,6	6,1	5,6	6	5
Egypt	5,4	4,2	4,8	4,3	5,8	5,7	6	5,3
Jordan	6	6	5,4	5,3	3,9	4	5,3	4,6
Morocco	4,3	4,4	4	4,7	5,1	4,7	5	4,3
Syria	5,9	6,6	6	7	7	7	7	6,5
Tunisia	6	5	5,4	4,6	5,9	5	6,4	5

All information taken from [www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org)

PR short for Political rights, CL short for Civil Liberties

However, when discussing democracy as a whole, a comparison of the two indexes is interesting, as they reveal different characteristics of a regime. Syria is a good example of the difference of the indicators. Categorized as a competitive authoritarian system, it has average Freedom House scores of 7 in political rights and 6,5 in civil rights, giving us a prime example of a country with seemingly democratic political institutions, but with almost no civil or political liberties. This kind of results strengthens the idea that many Middle Eastern regimes included democratic institutions to co-opt opposition, and not to further democratize (see for instance Schlumberger/Albrecht:2006). Both Tunisia and Egypt, along with Syria has the worst Freedom



House scores, but while the Syrian scores show constantly low results, this is not the case for Tunisia and Egypt. Their civil liberties scores were among the best in the region in the 80ies (for Tunisia) and 70ies/80ies for Egypt. Could these former high figures have anything to do with the regime breakdowns?

## 7. Prior liberalizations

Brownlee (2009:527) obtains correlations for prior liberalizations on regime breakdown. This variable is among the most highly correlated ones explaining regime breakdowns in fact, and therefore deserves some comments. Both Egypt and Tunisia experienced several liberalizing periods since independence, I will only comment on the ones under the latest regimes of Ben Ali and Mubarak, since former periods will not be of major importance for the young generation in Egypt and Tunisia taking part in the demonstrations earlier this year.

In this section, both the DPI index and the Freedom House scores can be of interest, since political liberalizations normally concerns both political institutions and political/civil rights. To extend the information given above, I have plotted each year of the two indexes in the table below to explain the liberalization periods in more detail.

Table 13 Years as liberalized measured as Freedom House civil liberties from 1980-2011

Country	Years as liberalized	Years as not liberalized
Algerie	1989-1991	1980-1988 and 1992-2011
Egypt	1984-1990	1981 and 1991-2011
Jordan	1991-1997, 1999-2000 and 2005-2008	1980-1990, 1998, 2001-4 and 2009-2011
Morocco	1981, 1989-1990 and 1998-2000, 2004-2011	1982-1988, 1991-1997 and 2001-2003
Syria	-	1980-2011
Tunisia	1988-1991	1980-1987 and 1991-2011

Data from Freedom House, [www.Freedomhouse.org](http://www.Freedomhouse.org). Liberalized is measured as civil liberty score of 1-4, not liberalized is measured with civil liberty score of 5-7

However, the main analytical tool when understanding liberalizations is the civil liberties scores, so these will be compared first.

Just from looking at the Freedom House scores one can see that the liberalization period of Egypt lasted from 1984-1990 (Freedom House CL scores at 4) while the Tunisian liberalization experience was somewhat shorter and a bit more intense from 1988-90, with a record high civil liberty score at 3 in 1989. In Egypt the liberalization was also followed up with an increase in political rights in the start of the period, while the Tunisian scores only reached the 5-level in their three years of liberalization. Syria has no liberalizing periods, while Morocco and Jordan has fluctuations in liberalization for several periods in time.

In his first years as a president, Ben Ali made a national pact<sup>46</sup> with the opposition, and promised democratization in the years to come. The press experienced a period of freedom never felt before, and many political parties were legalized. Among these parties was the so-called Hezb En Nadha (renaissance party), an islamist party with a strong youth movement. It is uncertain if Ben Ali really wanted a thorough democratization or just needed to identify his opposition. With the Algerian crises as an excuse, his crackdown on the formerly legal islamist opposition did not meet a lot of protest internationally. It is commonly agreed that the election was rigged as the ruling RCD party won a great majority after the second tour of the vote. All of the 141 seats in the parliament remained in the hands of the ruling party, and Ben Ali continued as a president with 99,27 percent of the votes<sup>47</sup>. After the elections Ben Ali carefully increased his presidential powers and closed the doors for any kind of challenging opposition movements. The RCD party did share its places in parliament with other parties in the later elections, but all of the parties elected were voting with the RCD in important matters, and most of the parties even supported the Ben Ali candidacy up until the 2009 presidential election. Seeing no other possibilities, some opposition forces was cooperating with the regime to gain advantages, and at the same time, they functioned as Ben Ali's democratic alibi on the international arena.

As mentioned, the Egyptian liberalizing period was longer than that of Tunisia, but some of the same features are present. Like Sadat, Mubarak was believed to have been chosen as a vice

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<sup>46</sup> See for instance Lacoste, Camille et Yves (1991), *L'Etat du Maghreb*, Editions La Decouverte

<sup>47</sup> Lacoste, Camille et Yves (1991), *L'Etat du Maghreb*, Editions La Decouverte, page 391

president for his lack of charisma and of seemingly unwillingness to have political power. As the highest ranking officer in the air-force, Mubarak did not have any previous political experience before being chosen as a vice president, but as expected, his presidential term was confirmed by a referendum in 1981, after the assassination of Sadat by Islamic Jihad (Fisher:1995:363)<sup>48</sup>. In the first general election in his presidential term, Mubarak announced the first free election in 1984 with new opposition parties recognized. But the peculiar election law with an 8 percent minimum level to enter parliament, only the New Wafd party took 59 of the 448 seats, leaving the rest of the places to the NDP. As the 1986 political rights score show, the environment for political opposition slowly returned to its “normal” low level, while the civil liberties were kept at a relatively high level until 1991 when a new crackdown on political islamist (among them the Ikhwan, or the Muslim Brotherhood) took off after the outbreak of the Algerian civil-war. While Ben Ali managed to break the islamist opposition down completely by arresting hundreds of supporters (see for instance Brand:197), while the rest fled the country, Mubaraks islamist opposition was quite different from that of its Tunisian counterpart, and could not be broken easily. The Muslim brotherhood with its long history was a huge organization with social and educational institutions, and it also participated in the leadership in many important trade unions. It was therefore not in the interest of Mubarak to break the organization completely as it performed tasks that otherwise would have to be done by the state itself. The Ikhwan has established primary and secondary schools as well as hospitals and numerous charity associations.

From 1991 and onwards no liberalization efforts of major importance was undertaken in Tunisia or Egypt, and most of the civil society organization formed in that period was either co-opted, stopped by different kinds of measures by the regime or parallel organizations were formed. The term GO-NGO's (government-organized non-governmental organizations) is fitting quite a few of these organizations. After the islamist had been silenced in Tunisia, the new favorite kick-bag of the regime was the human-rights organizations like the Ligue Tunisienne des droits de l'Homme or Femmes democrats. They were prevented from holding meetings, from speaking to foreign visitors/embassies, and their leaders were insulted in the national press.

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<sup>48</sup> Fisher, J.B's chapter on Egypt in *The Middle East and North Africa 1995*, Forty-first edition, Europa publications Limited, page 363

Similar happenings was found the same time in Egypt, and the government also tried to regain control of the different trade unions under islamist control (Brownlee:2002:8)<sup>49</sup>. According to Eberhard Kienle (1999:221)<sup>50</sup> the islamist problem was used to pursue a general de-liberalization of the Egyptian society, including co-opting newly established opposition and regaining control of lost fields of support. However, another force appeared through the Supreme Constitutional Court with its demand to have judges monitoring every polling station in the country. Consequently, the 2005 was one of the fairest in Egyptian history, giving the Muslim Brotherhood 20 percent of the votes and 88 candidates in the parliament by launching independent candidates (Abu Saif/Lamnouer:2007:8)<sup>51</sup>. The Muslim brotherhood still had no authorization to act as a political party. Election-fraud returned in the 2010 elections, and the brotherhood as well as the Wafd party boycotted the elections (Dunne/Hamzawy:2010)<sup>52</sup>.

As mentioned, the liberalization periods in the two countries bear some of the same characteristics, but the Egyptian experience lasted longer than the Tunisian liberalization attempt. As for the importance of liberalization, studies like Noland (2005:13)<sup>53</sup> confirm the effect of prior liberalization on democratic transitions in his large N-study on Middle Eastern authoritarianism. I think that a comparison of the two indexes above (Freedom House and the World Bank Liec-scores) could be used in future large N-studies, as the DPI index is more specific than the Freedom House scores when recording changes in political institutions. This index would then be more helpful to understand if the liberalizations are part of a general democratization process, or if it's just a targeted, reversible type of liberalization.

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<sup>49</sup> Brownlee, Jason, (2002), The decline of pluralism in Mubarak's Egypt, in Journal of Democracy Volume 13, Number 4 October 2002

<sup>50</sup> Kienle, Eberhard (1999) More than a Response to Islamism: The Political Deliberalization of Egypt in the 1990s Middle East Journal, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Spring, 1998), pp. 219-235

<sup>51</sup> Abu Saif, Atef and Lamouer, Amel (2007), L'intégration politique de mouvements islamistes par le biais d'élections démocratiques : le cas des Frères musulmans en Égypte et du Hamas en Palestine, Euromesco paper no 63, september 2007,

<sup>52</sup> Dunne, Michele and Hamzawy, Amr (2010), From too much Egyptian opposition to too little – and leges worries besides. Carnegie Commentary, December 13, 2010 on [www.carnegieendowment.org](http://www.carnegieendowment.org)

<sup>53</sup> Noland, Marcus, (2005) Explaining Middle Eastern Authoritarianism, institute for national economics, Working Paper Series, number 05-5 june 2005, Washington DC, see [www.iie.com](http://www.iie.com)

Table 14 Freedom House scores, Political rights (PR) and Civil liberties (CL) and the Database of political institutions (DPI) LIEC-score (Legislative and Executive Indices of Electoral Competitiveness) from 1980-2010 (liec 1980-2009)

	Egypt			Tunisia				Egypt			Tunisia		
Year	PR	CL	DPI	PR	CL	DPI	Year	PR	CL	DPI	PR	CL	DPI
1980	5	5	6	6	5	4	1996	6	6	6	6	5	6
1981	5	5	6	5	5	4	1997	6	6	6	6	5	6
1982	5	5	6	5	5	5	1998	6	6	6	6	5	6
1983	5	5	6	5	5	5	1999	6	5	6	6	5	6
1984	4	4	6	5	5	5	2000	6	5	6	6	5	6
1985	4	4	6	5	5	5	2001	6	6	6	6	5	6
1986	5	4	6	6	5	5	2002	6	6	6	6	5	6
1987	5	4	6	6	5	5	2003	6	5	6	6	5	6
1988	5	4	6	6	4	5	2004	6	5	6	6	5	6
1989	5	4	6	5	3	5	2005	6	5	6	6	5	6
1990	5	4	6	5	4	5	2006	6	5	6	6	5	6
1991	5	5	6	5	5	5	2007	6	5	6	7	5	6
1992	5	6	6	6	5	5	2008	6	5	6	7	5	6
1993	6	6	6	6	5	5	2009	6	5	6	7	5	6
1994	6	6	6	6	5	5	2010	6	5	-	7	5	-
1995	6	6	6	6	5	6							

Data taken from the two web sites; [www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org) and [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)

Looking at the other countries in the selected group, Jordan, Morocco and Algeria has all had times of liberalization, Algeria a short period of two years only at the same time as neighboring Tunisia. Jordan and Morocco, on the contrary, has registered many years as liberalized, and according to Lust-Okar/Jamal (1992) monarchies does have a greater legitimacy and can allow

liberalization periods without risking losing any of its powers. Republics like Algeria, Syria, Tunisia or Egypt must be more careful, and among those four countries, only Egypt has opened up for longer periods of liberalization. But looking at the political rights score and the DPI scores, the liberalizations did never lead to major democratization projects. Liberalizations can be caused by internal domestic events, but also by external diffusion effects on different levels in the society.

## 8. Diffusion effect

The Tunisian flags and posters visible in the Egyptian uprisings were only some of the very visible signs of the diffusion of ideas from the Tunisian to the Egyptian demonstrations. The Brinks/Coppegde (2006) model tests diffusion in different types of networks, and I will look at three different types of networks here; the contiguous (meaning the bordering countries of Tunisia and Egypt), the Arab countries and finally I will make some comments on diffusion from the super-powers. Even if France is normally not considered a superpower, the historical and economical ties with Tunisia makes it the most important country influencing their former southern protectorate, and after the Camp David accord, the relation between Egypt and the U.S. has grown much stronger. Therefore, I look at possible U.S. influence on Egypt and France's diffusion on Tunisia in the super-power network.

The table is too big to be put in the text, so it is located after the bibliography and named appendix 1. Looking at the Freedom House civil liberty scores for the Arab world from 1980-2010 (including all Arab countries, except the target countries, Tunisia and Egypt), the average is not changing substantially in any periods of time. The only interesting change actually occurs in 1989-90 at a time when all Eastern Europe finds itself in hasty transitions towards democracy. The political rights score in the Arab world for this period is worsening, and continues at the low level until the last measurement of 2010. Is it possible that this is a sign of continuous negative diffusion effect on our two target countries? As mentioned also under the past liberalization chapter, most of the countries in the group has experienced some sort of liberalization (with the exception of Syria), but most of them return to back to old authoritarian ways.

To follow the argument of Brinks/Coppedge (2006), Tunisia is included in the group of countries possibly affecting Egypt, and vice versa. Since Tunisia's regime fell before that of Egypt, the diffusion effects on the Ben Ali breakdown is looked at first.

## 8.1. Diffusion effects for Tunisia

If one studies the networks possibly affecting Tunisia (Algeria/Libya, Arab world and France) no changes in these networks (except for France) paves the way for positive diffusion effects. Looking at the scores of Libya (constantly 7 in both political rights and civil liberties) and Algeria (6 in political rights and 5 in civil liberties since 1999),- excludes a diffusion effect towards Tunisia with its 7-score in political liberties and 5-score in civil liberties (years 2008-2010). Though the relation with Libya has been frozen at times, the relation to the Algerian regime has mostly been excellent, especially during the Presidency of Bouteflika. Brand cites one example here (Brand:1998:194)<sup>54</sup>, claiming that members of the Algerian ruling party FLN strongly warned their Tunisian counterparts in the Tunisian RCD party against continuing the liberalization efforts started a year earlier.

While Libya has constant low scores, Algeria actually experience a period of liberalization at the same time as Tunisia (from 1989-91). The tragic Algerian civil war starting in that period had much written about effects on the liberalizations in all of the Arabic countries. Many regimes used the opportunity to crack down not only on Islamic opposition in the aftermath of the war, but also on other, secular civil society organizations.

The second network to be tested is that of the Arab world. Looking at the last few years, Tunisia is very close to the average of the Arab world on the civil rights score (average 5,23, Tunisia 5). There is a small difference however since 2007 on the political rights score. Tunisia has managed to move up among the most authoritarian states the last few years with its 7-score, moving it slightly away from the Arab world average (around 6 the last few years). The opposite direction of the general Arab score vis-à-vis the rest of the world in the late 80ies/early 90ies could be interpreted as a fear among Arab autocrats of the liberalizations on their doorsteps could spread

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<sup>54</sup> Brand, Laurie A. 1998, *Woman, the state and political liberalization, Middle Eastern and North African Experiences*, Colombia University Press, 1998

to the region. By limiting opposition even more than previously, the regimes managed to keep all the Arab regimes in line, at least until the recent events.

As for the global trends Tunisia is constantly under the global average in both civil liberties and political rights. The best years for Tunisia was 1988-89, a period when the country for the first time landed at a score 3 in civil liberties. It is quite revealing for the region that this score is the highest Freedom House score ever seen by any Arabic regime since the 1980ies (when the selection is started). As mentioned in the previous chapters the first years of coming to power, Ben Ali did open up for some civil and political rights, but from 1990 and onwards, the trend turns negative again (see table). Domestically, the clear reduction in civil liberties (from score 3 in 1989 and back to score 5 in 1991) indicates that the opening up was not a clear push towards democracy but rather what Lawson (Schlumberger:2007:126) says was measures giving state officials higher certainty over political procedures and institutions.

The French Freedom House scores are stable, either 1-2 or 1-1. As former colonizing power and by far the biggest trade partner, the trade deals made with France did not push very hard for further liberalization or democratization for their southern neighbor, and there have been no major crises in the relationships between the two countries since the Bizerte crises in the 1960ies.

From the abovementioned figures one should believe that the cohesion among the Arab regimes is much more important than relations to the superpowers, since the whole region has managed to avoid the diffusion effect of democracy since the 1970ies. Until this January it was the only world region that hadn't seen major transitions towards democracy. In addition, a study like Nolands' (2005:8) suggests that "Arabness" does have a correlated effect on the preservation of authoritarianism and thus preventing the region from moving towards democracy.

## 8.2. Egypt and diffusion

Egypt has stayed close to the freedom scores of both their Arab neighbors (not to that of Israel, a country I will not comment on here due to its unique background and heritage), and to the Arab network of countries in general. Libya is mentioned under the Tunisian case, and the Sudan is in the same category as Libya (highest (in a negative sense) freedom scores, both on 7). Saudi



Arabia has a slightly better civil liberty score of 6 the last few years, but the political rights score is 7. The improved period in Egypt's scores (1983-91) is much longer than that of Tunisia, that only saw improvement 2-3 years time from 1988-90. It is highly possible that the pressure from entering the US sphere of influence with the Camp David accord did produce these rather prolonged effects of higher freedom scores. The US scores are constantly at the score 1 on both civil liberties and political rights. The extensive military aid packages did contain demands for increased democratization. These demands were relaxed after the effect of the Algerian crisis in 1990, and partly changed for a more extensive anti-terror cooperation. The size of the countries could be of importance also as Tunisia is one of the smaller Arabic nations, with two large military powers as neighbors. Egypt on the other hand is not matched militarily by any other Arab nation, and it would be difficult for other Arab regimes to dictate internal Egyptian regime choices.

### 8.2.1. Egypt; from Kifaya to the 6<sup>th</sup> of April movement

Apparent also in the freedom scores, internet and media censorship had been weaker in Egypt than in Tunisia, and several networks had been used already to gather people for demonstrations. The first attempt was the urban phenomenon of Kifaya (it means enough! In Arabic). They held several demonstrations and internet campaigns for democratic changes in Egypt from 2006, but when the leadership was arrested or harassed, the organization broke up most of their activities.

In the Mahalla labor uprisings in 2008 the ground was laid for a more unified demonstration force, including youth movements and the labor unions, and out of these uprisings the April 6<sup>th</sup> internet group started. This movement had a major logistical role the uprisings in Egypt in January-February this year. From 2008 it had almost 3 years to build up knowledge about how to make revolutions. Interviews on al Jazeera show how the members were sent to Serbia to gain first-hand knowledge from the former regime-breakdown there. Videos from the Serbian colleagues were distributed among their members. Like in Tunisia, these kinds of internet groups cautioned people on where to go to demonstrate, and also dictated, to a certain extent, the claims of the demonstrators. The Mubarak regime had learnt the lesson of the Tunisian uprisings and after only two days of demonstration, the regime took a decision that could have been

devastating on the demonstrations; it closed down the internet, sealed off the al Jazeera office and took the station off air. In some areas, the mobile lines were erupted also. But by then, the demonstrators already had all their demand ready; the dictator must go, as must his government. The action taken by the government shows it great importance of internet and the satellite new TV stations in the Tunisian revolts, and the Egyptian leadership had quickly taken knowledge of this fact. But with one regime down, the Egyptians in Tahrir square would not settle for less than their Tunisian colleagues.

### 8.3. Diffusion channels social networks and satellite TV-news channels, and blocked diffusion

As Brinks/Coppedge mentions (2006:469) they do not test for particular diffusion channels, and it is quite understandable as the statistical material for the model is already vast, both in range and in time. The analyzing unit is regimes, and it is possible that there is a diffusion effect in the Arab countries on a sub-regime level through social Medias and satellite TV-news channels. This diffusion however had been blocked from being practiced by the regime through different kinds of repressive measures.

Table 15 Internet users per 100 persons

Country/year	1995	2000	2005	2009
Algeria	0	0,5	5,8	13,5
Egypt	0	0,6	11,7	20,0
Jordan	0	2,7	13,3	29,3
Morocco	0	0,7	15,1	32,2
Syria	0	0,2	5,6	18,7
Tunisia	0	2,7	9,5	33,5
World average	0,8	6,7	16,0	27,1

Data from The World Bank, [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)

When looking at Tunisia today, only a few months after the regime breakdown, it is clear that the sophisticated debates going on everywhere has its roots many years prior to the happenings in January 2011. Diffusion has taken place, but it did not lead to an immediate regime change; rather it resulted in crack-downs on different types of media and key actors the last few years.

The table shows a fast increase in internet users in Tunisia the last ten years, it was the highest in Africa last year, not surprisingly. Large programs to educate children in computer science and campaigns to get every family their own computer has been carried out the last few years. Simultaneously, Tunisia was considered one of the worst off countries for censorship of internet and the media in general (find figures/table). While the regime desperately used all national mass media to transmit their glossy economic and social success story of Tunisia, the general public now had access to the other side of the story, and was also feed information on how the democratic world functioned. When the wiki leak files on Tunisia was published (censored in Tunisia at the time naturally),- most people were already well aware of the corruption and nepotism of the regime, but very few spoke about it outside the walls of their homes. The last few years before the regime breakdown, large parts of the population avoided the censorship by using so-called proxies. When YouTube was opened to the big public the 13<sup>th</sup> of January, most young Tunisians were already familiar with the site.

Diffusion of ideas definitely took place since internet entered the majority of Tunisian households, but the new knowledge was blocked from being used. One could not be politically active, one could not write critical articles, and one could not speak openly about political questions. The only voice allowed was the voice of the regime and its allies. So the diffusion effect certainly was present, but it was blocked from being of any use, at the moment at least.

The idea about blocked diffusion is not considered in the Brinks/Coppedge model, and it is also very difficult to measure statistically. One can make assumptions according to number of internet users, but the direction of the diffusion is unclear. Further research is needed to understand and measure the variable.

Another addition to the model is to further define the channel of communication. Apart from the

internet, news TV-channels like al Jazeera has played a major role in educating the Arab public into thinking critically. As mentioned earlier, a Tunisian poll from February this year (Sigma:2011), shows peoples strong belief in foreign media as important for the regime breakdown. For the first time the Arab world had a news channel with real news from the Arab countries, in their own language. The resistance from many Arab regimes against the channel shows its importance in the Arab public, and like mentioned earlier, Tunisia closed their embassy in Qatar in protest to bad publicity on al Jazeera back in 2006, when they interviewed the Tunisian opposition leader Marzouki. The Telegraph-journalist Tony Hardnen calls the Arab uprisings the “al Jazeera moment”<sup>55</sup>, claiming that the American President himself and his wife watched al Jazeera to be informed about the developments in the Arab region at that time.

In addition to the social networks and the news satellite TV channels, the Tunisian public was already among the best educated in the region, a fact that made it easier to digest and capture the information available on the net.

When it comes to the period before the regime breakdown, no single Tunisian internet community can be said to have had a leadership or even a coordination role in the uprisings. In fact, it has been claimed that the lack of leadership was one of the main reasons the uprisings could continue. The regime had no leader to arrest, since there was no single group or organism behind the uprisings. They started as spontaneous demonstrations after a tragic event, and continued to gather support due to accumulated anger against a corrupt and nepotistic regime. Clips of the tragic crack-down of the demonstrations in Kasserine and Thela sent even more people out in the streets to defy the regime.

Apart from having had a long-term educational effect, the internet and satellite TV news networks also functioned as a essential communication aid during the uprisings, in addition to text-messages. Before the 14<sup>th</sup> of January, face book was a great aid in mobilizing people for demonstrations and also on places to avoid. For the first time in years live reports from Tunisia

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<sup>55</sup> Hardnen, Tony, (2011), Online article, Wednesday 25 May 2011, “The 'Arab Spring' uprisings of 2011 are being hailed in Washington as the 'Al-Jazeera moment'”, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk>

could be seen on al Jazeera, and the pictures of the thousands of people demonstrating surely made many others join them. Until then, demonstrations were almost unseen in Tunisia, the last ones took place in the remote mining town of Redeyef in 2008, far away from the public eye and al Jazeera. A Tunisian blogger interviewed on al Jazeera explained how the triangle of information worked during the uprisings; people on the ground filmed the demonstrations and the police responses on their cellular phones, then downloading the videos to Facebook and YouTube, that with their own dynamics spread the videos online. The last cornerstone in the triangle is that of al Jazeera transmitting the videos for the rest of the population to watch.

The chaotic days following the 14<sup>th</sup> saw an even more vital use of the internet as an efficient communication source. The police had all of a sudden disappeared, leaving only a small military force in charge of the security in a country with all the nations' prisoners on the run. The biggest security risk however was the security forces themselves. With hundreds of presidential guards and militias wanting to create chaos for the people to cry out for the return of Ben Ali, people were sending vital information about rental cars to look out for and sending this information to the neighborhood guards in the streets all over the country.

#### 8.4. Possible adjustments in the diffusion model

Coming back to the Brinks/Coppegdes' diffusion model, it is highly possible that the Arab world as a network has been able to keep the member countries within the authoritarian sphere through negative diffusion. There is a clear cross-pressure on the target countries as the average Arab scores and the influencing super-power scores are so different. In this matter, Tunisia seems to differ somewhat from Egypt, as the relation to France does not seem to have created a strong positive diffusion effect, while it is possible that the US influence on Egypt did have such effects. The authors do mention such cross pressure (2006:467), and the logic of the argument says that a country will choose to accommodate the network giving the highest rewards for accommodation,- so it is likely to believe that the Arab network is stronger and gives greater rewards than accommodation with the superpowers. Egypt has possibly tried to accommodate both of the networks, by opening up somewhat to opposition forces, but still having full power in most important areas. The US role during the uprisings shows the complexity of US involvement

in the region. It is a country considered to be the cradle of democracy, but was one of the last international powers to give unconditional support to the demands of the demonstrators. Shadi Hamid called the uprisings in Egypt an “impossible dilemma” for the US administration (Hamid,2011)<sup>56</sup>. Their regional security concern seemed to count as much as the wish for global democracy.

Other networks could also have been tested, for instance changes in the European Union vis-à-vis the target country, as most of the trade of both Egypt and Tunisia is done with the EU. As Martinez (2009:15)<sup>57</sup> claims, the promise of closer EU relations was not important enough for the Maghreb countries to democratize, as it has shown to be in other Eastern European countries and Turkey for instance.

The abovementioned diffusion effects were all at a regime-level, but I have also added sub-regime variables by discussing the effect of Social Medias and foreign TV networks. These channels of diffusion however did not cause changes in the Freedom House scores and I therefore chose to call this effect blocked diffusion.

Looking at the Tunisian society today, just a few months after the 14<sup>th</sup> of January, it is clear that the basis of the heated political debates in all the medias has been laid long before that Friday in January, and diffusion via Social Media and TV networks could be one of the main educators in the ongoing political and civil debates.

For the Egyptian case, the diffusion effect from the Tunisian experience was clear both on a regime and sub-regime level. Furthermore, the Egyptian internet group, April the 6<sup>th</sup> movement, clearly states building up their strategy by learning from European revolutionary movements.

## 9. Triggering variable; the military

To fully grasp the success of the uprisings, the role of the military cannot be forgotten. Their roles are different in the two countries, but there are certainly similarities also. Looking at the

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<sup>56</sup> Hamid, Shadi (2011) “After Tunisia: Obama’s Impossible Dilemma in Egypt, Could the US find itself on the wrong side of history?” Article in the Atlantic, no 1/2011, website [www.theatlantic.com](http://www.theatlantic.com)

<sup>57</sup> Martinez, Luiz (2009) “Maghreb: vaincre la peur de la démocratie” Cahier de Chaillot, no 115, avril 2009, Institut d’Etudes de Sécurité

military expenditure of Tunisia, it reveals a great difference compared to the selected countries with its low number under the world average. Having spent the years before Tunisia's independence in 1956 in Cairo, Bourguiba, Tunisia's first president was aware of the dangers of a strong military. As leader of a small country he reasoned that no matter how big military Tunisia had, it would be taken by its neighbors in times of war, and he only established a small, professional army. Bourguiba feared a military coup like the one experienced in Egypt when Nasser put the first president Najib in house arrest and took the presidential title himself. The following president Ben Ali actually chose the same road like Bourguiba for similar reasons. Ben Ali did however build up a large presidential security unit, as well as an infamous secret police force.

Table 16 Military expenditure in percent of Gross Domestic Product

Country/year	1990	1995	2000	2005	2009
Algeria	1,5	3,0	3,4	2,9	3,8
Egypt	4,7	3,9	3,2	2,9	2,1
Jordan	8,0	4,5	6,2	4,8	5,5
Morocco	4,1	4,4	2,3	3,4	3,3
Syria	6,4	6,9	5,3	5,1	5,2
Tunisia	2,0	1,9	1,7	1,6	1,4
World average	3,6	2,4	2,3	2,5	2,6

All data from the World Bank, [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)

The military found itself outside the inner power circles in Tunisia, and there had been talks about unsuccessful coup attempts in the 80ies and 90ies. When the uprisings spread to the capital in January 2011, the armed forces rolled into Tunis for the first time in decades, and perhaps unlike the Egyptians, most Tunisians was not sure what to expect from army. But when the

armed forces general, Rachid Ben Ammar famously said no to Ben Ali when asking him to shoot the protestors, Ben Ali knew that he had lost the power-game. A possible coup-attempt by the presidential guard chief, Ali Seriati was also crushed by the army, and from then on, the army was in charge of all the security in the country. The unpopular police forces were temporarily removed. Had the army chosen to shoot the demonstrators the Arab spring might just turned out to be another Arab winter.

Table 17 Armed forces personnel in percent of total labor force

Country/year	1990	1995	2000	2005	2009
Algeria	2,5	2,1	2,7	2,4	2,3
Egypt	2,6	3,2	3,1	3,2	3,2
Jordan	13,4	10,6	10,4	6,7	5,7
Morocco	2,6	2,6	2,7	2,4	2,1
Syria	12,5	12,5	8,6	6,9	5,8
Tunisia	1,4	1,8	1,5	1,3	1,2
World average	1,1	1,2	1,1	0,9	0,9

All data from the World Bank, [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)

Following Geddes' (1999a:12-18) game-theoretical argumentation, the game called "game of the sexes" is used to understand the power struggles in the military. The game is the following: a couple, both would prefer to go out together, but the wife wants to go to the cinema and the husband to the theatre. The couple here being Ben Ali and the military, going out together could possibly lead to a civil war, since fractions within the military was already against the regime after being put on the sideline in Tunisia for decades. The budget of the military had constantly been reduced to a minimum the last decades, and continuing the same road with Ben Ali and possibly enter into a civil war would be too high a price to pay. So, General Ben Ammar chose to



say no to kill the demonstrators, and the Tunisian military is today perhaps the only state institution with some kind of popularity, and their budget has already been increased as the army today is in charge of security on most levels in the country. The officers could possibly had done as in Egypt, take the political power, - but Tunisia is not Egypt, and a military take-over would only had caused more demonstrations and further unrest. Even with the extreme weakness of the new civilian governments, I suspect that most Tunisians prefer a civilian government before military rule.

The Egyptian police forces looked very similar to their Tunisian counterparts during the uprisings, mixing civilian and uniformed police officers and cracking hard down on the demonstrators. The army entered the scene, but as their Tunisian colleagues, they did not shoot on the protestors. The Egyptian military has played a major role both in the Egyptian society, but also in the newer Middle Eastern history, with its wars and finally its controversial peace with Israel. After the Camp David agreement in 1979, the military expenditure of Egypt has been reduced, and is now one of the lowest in the region in terms of percent of GDP. But with its large population, the military is still a force to reckon with. Besides, all of the Presidents since independence came from the military. Egypt employs 80.000-100.000 persons in the production of military hardware (Droz Vincent:2007:200)<sup>58</sup>, making the military even more important. The power vacuum experienced in Tunisia after the regime breakdown was quickly filled in Egypt by the military. In fact, some political commentators call the regime breakdown in Egypt a military take-over, so until free elections are held and power is transferred to civil politicians, the transition of the Egyptian regime is uncertain.

The power-relation between Mubarak and the military is quite different than that of Ben Ali and the Tunisian army. Egypt has been a regional military power since the coup in 1952. When the demonstrations started in Egypt, the Egyptians used the experience from Tunisia to encourage the army to take the same role as in Tunisia, as a protector of the people, and not an enemy. The military officers also looked at their Tunisian colleges, and was confronted with the same dilemma; going with Mubarak into a civil war or with the people to avoid it. The military already

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<sup>58</sup> Droz Vincent, Philippe, 2007, in Scumberger, Oliver, *Debating Arab Authoritarianism, Dynamics and durability in non-democratic regimes*, Stanford university press. His chapter is called: changing role of Middle Eastern Armies

had a power structure that Mubarak used for consultation, and contrary to Tunisia, the military decided to take power themselves.

Looking at the other countries in the selected group, Syrian and Jordanian military expenditure is extremely high, 6-7 times the global average. The Syrian military officers constitute a large part of the employed population, and military officers are also forming an important part of the Syrian business elite (Droz-Vincent in Schlumberger:2007:202). With such an important support in the current regimes, it is highly probable that the military will support the regime in times of social uprisings. Both Morocco and Jordan are monarchies, and none of these two countries has seen anti-governmental protests yet. Demonstrators here stress the wish for democratic reforms, but in the same time tend to support the king.

Algeria's figures are in the middle level among the group-members, but with a civil war fresh in the memory, many officers would perhaps opt for a repression of opposition before it might cause country-wide problems.

It is clear in any case, that the military, even the weakest army like the Tunisian one, does play a key role in any uprisings, in particular in the Middle Eastern region with their record high military expenditures.

The military was the last to enter the conflicts in the Middle East, and it is also the last variable analyzed here. It is time then to sum up the arguments discussed.

## 10. Conclusion

In many ways, the result of this journey has been full of surprises, with an end-result quite different from what I expected. Let's take a look at the different hypothesis launched and what the result of the analysis is.

H1: Economy was the single most important short term and long term cause of the regime breakdowns

After analyzing indicator after indicator, no clear common answer was found in the jungle of

economics to explain the regime breakdowns. This was highly surprising, as I considered it to be the main explanation at the start of the analysis. The GDP per capita did not show large changes, and the rest of the indicators did not show common patterns. The unemployment figures however, did show strong proof in the case of Tunisia, with its constant high level. Egypt did not differ from the rest of the group-countries on this variable, but it did experience large price rises the years leading up to the regime breakdown. Tunisia lay well under the world average on this indicator.

H2: Changes in distribution of wealth is more correlated to regime breakdown than a change in GDP per capita.

I expected the income-distribution patterns to be of more importance than the GDP per capita, but mainly due to lacking data, it was difficult to draw firm conclusions. Tunisia did have a somewhat deviating pattern, but not different enough to use the distributions as the main explanation as a push factor in the uprisings. It is however, likely that a skewed income distribution pattern favoring the rich has had a larger effect than changes in the GDP per capita, at least in the Tunisian case. As for Egypt, no such conclusions could be confirmed.

H3: The introduction of democratic institutions (hybridness) has had prolonging effect on both regimes

The democratic institutions in the so-called hybrid regimes did not have an accelerating effect on the breakdown, quite the contrary. In fact, the strongest authoritarian regimes of Tunisia and Egypt fell first,- before the competitive authoritarian countries like Algeria and Syria. As for the two monarchies, Jordan and Morocco, these have their own internal logics and as such regimes have higher legitimacy, it has not been a demand by the protestors to make their kings leave. The possibility for a peaceful transition towards democracy should therefore be larger in those two countries than in the republics. Old dictators have few places to go, while kings can stay on in a constitutional monarchy.

By using two types of categorization, the power-base definition of Geddes (1999) seems to give

much more interesting explanations of regime breakdown than the hybrid regime definition. Geddes arguments about the underlying logics of the different types of regimes helped to understand why the regimes fell due to uprisings and not internal splits. It also gave an explanation of why the regimes could last as long as they did. The importance of this categorization was not expected in the start of the essay.

H4: Liberalizing past has only minor effect in the starting of the uprising in Tunisia, but could have had some effect when pushing the middle class and professionals to join the demonstrations at a later stage for the case of Tunisia. The effect could have been of more importance in the Egyptian case.

The liberalizing past-variable has shown itself to be perhaps the strongest indicator affecting the regime breakdown. I did not expect the variable to be as important as it showed itself to be, but past research (Brownlee(2009), Noland (2005)) made large N-studies confirming the importance of liberalizing past on regime breakdowns on a world level. The variable is probably as important in Egypt as in Tunisia.

H5: The military played key roles in both regime breakdowns.

The military managed to use the opportunity to help the uprisings turn into regime change. The military was never part of either side of the conflict when it started, but seized the day and pushed the dictators away from power, possibly to avoid civil war.

H6: The social medias and network TV news stations played a major long-term role as a diffusion channel in feeding the general public with real information, and hereby helped to increase the gap between the government feed information, creating higher level of discontent in the public in general. In the short run it provided vital information about demonstrations and dangers in general.

Negative diffusion in the Arab world network could have played an important role in keeping all the Arabic countries firmly within the authoritarian regime sphere, at least until recent events.

The recent change could be a sign of the weakening of this network, and if Tunisia and Egypt continues to stay alone in their democratization efforts in the Arab region, it is probable that the countries will strengthen cooperation with other democracies at the expense of the cooperation within the Arab world.

The relations found are summed up in the table below:

**Table 18 Relationship between the most important variables/indicators and possible strength (case-countries only)**

Country	Variable and indicator	Type of relation	Suggestion of strength of relation with regime breakdown
Tunisia	Economy Unemployment	Indirect effect creating poverty, lack of opportunities and disillusion and hence willingness to participate in uprisings	Medium/strong
Egypt	Economy Price increases	Indirect effect creating poverty and from there on willingness to participate in uprisings against the regime	Medium/strong
Tunisia	Economy Income distribution	Indirect effect creating disillusion and relative poverty, create hate against nepotistic regime	Weak to medium
Tunisia Egypt	Regime Hybridity	Direct effect  Possibly prolonging regime by co-opting opposition in democratic like institutions and giving the regime a democratic alibi internationally	Weak
Tunisia Egypt	Regime Power base	Direct effect  Single party system prolong regime as power struggles don't lead to splits internally. Biggest threat is therefore uprisings.	Medium/strong

Tunisia Egypt	Regime Liberal past	Indirect effect , as former liberalization creates civil society organizations ready to participate and organize uprisings when hope for regime change	Strong
Tunisia Egypt	Diffusion	Indirect effect as spreading of democratic ideas by social medias/TV creates wish for democracy and willingness to participate in uprisings	Medium/strong
Tunisia Egypt	Military	Direct effect on regime breakdown by siding with the demonstrators	Strong

## 10.1. The way ahead

Since one of my aims was to use as much statistical material as possible, some qualitative research areas like class-analysis and deeper structural explanations have been put aside. That does not mean that they were not important, but my aim was to analyze the two regime breakdown by looking at generalizations made in world-wide regime studies. As many of the hypotheses in the analysis were refused, or at least weakened, it would be interesting to understand and compare the structures and class constellations of the case countries also.

Another area that should be looked at more closely, both on a qualitative and quantitative level is the diffusion problematic. The model made by Brinks and Coppedge should be tested out in the region, and one should specify more closely the different parts of the model (like for instance type of network and diffusion channel). If Tunisia and Egypt manages to make permanent transitions to democracy, it will be extremely interesting to study the diffusion effects of such a transition in the Middle East.

I also launched the idea of blocked diffusion, - but found no real way of measuring it at this point in time. Perhaps data bases like the world value survey could be extended to include data from all the Arabic countries, something not available today.

As for the economic factors causing regime change, the analysis either suggest that there is something to the Middle Eastern exceptionalism, or possibly that several indicators of economic development should be included when analyzing regime change, not only that of GDP per capita. The problem with this approach is and probably always will be lack of data for certain indicators or countries.

Different regimes do break down differently, and Geddes categories of single party/personalist/military regimes helped greatly in understanding how and why. Her mixed categories complicate the analysis somewhat however, and the exclusion of monarchy is also a problem.

The last and obvious area to continue the research in the near future is the transitions started in the two countries studied here, and hopefully transitions in some of the neighboring countries also. Predictions for Egypt and Tunisia in creating real democracies in the future are quite good. As mentioned earlier, hybrid regimes do more often make transitions into democracy than more closed authoritarian regime types, and the richer the country, the higher the is the possibility of continued democratic reign. Another positive point is the Tunisians' and Egyptians' feeling of ownership to their revolutions. No foreign forces were present in the uprisings, and neither were any of the leading groups funded from abroad. The national pride and social cohesion found in the two countries today is much needed if a future transition to democracy shall succeed.

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## Appedix 1

### Freedom House scores 1980-2011, Civil Liberty (CL) and Political Rights (PR)

Year	1980		1981		1982		1983		1984		1985		1986		1987	
	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL
Average1	5,4	5,3	5,4	5,5	5,3	5,5	5,4	5,5	5,3	5,5	5,3	5,5	5,3	5,5	5,4	5,5
Average2	5,5	5,3	5,5	5,5	5,3	5,5	5,4	5,5	5,3	5,5	5,3	5,5	5,4	5,5	5,5	5,6
Algeria	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
Libya	6	6	6	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
Saudi Arabia	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	6	7	6	7	6	7	6	7
Sudan	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	4	5	4	5
Egypt	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	5	4	5	4
Tunisia	6	5	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	6	5	6	5
U.S.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
France	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2

Year	1988		1989		1990		1991		1992		1993		1994		1995	
	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL
Average1	5,5	5,5	6,1	5,4	6	5,5	5,9	5,4	6	5,5	6,1	5,8	6,1	5,9	6	5,9
Average2	5,5	5,5	6,1	5,3	6	5,5	5,9	5,4	6,1	5,4	6,1	5,7	6,1	5,9	6	5,8
Algeria	5	6	6	4	4	4	4	4	7	6	7	6	7	7	6	6
Libya	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
Saudi Arabia	6	7	7	6	7	6	7	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
Sudan	4	5	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
Egypt	5	4	5	4	5	4	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
Tunisia	6	4	5	3	5	4	5	5	6	5	6	5	6	5	6	5

U.S.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
France	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2

Year	1996		1997		1998		1999		2000		2001		2002		2003	
	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL
Average1	6	5,9	6	5,9	6	5,8	5,9	5,6	5,9	5,6	6	5,8	6,1	5,7	5,9	5,8
Average2	6	5,8	6	5,8	6	5,7	5,9	5,6	5,9	5,6	6	5,7	6,1	5,6	5,9	5,7
Algeria	6	6	6	6	6	5	6	5	6	5	6	5	6	5	6	5
Libya	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
Saudi Arabia	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
Sudan	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
Egypt	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	6	5	6	6	6	6	6	6
Tunisia	6	5	6	5	6	5	6	5	6	5	6	5	6	5	6	5
U.S.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
France	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	1

Year	2004		2005		2006		2007		2008		2009		2010	
	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL
Average1	5,9	5,5	5,9	5,4	5,9	5,1	5,9	5,1	5,9	5,2	6	5,1	6	5,2
Average2	5,9	5,9	5,9	5,4	5,9	5,1	5,9	5,1	5,9	5,2	6,1	5,1	6,1	5,2
Algeria	6	5	6	5	6	5	6	5	6	5	6	5	6	5
Libya	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
Saudi Arabia	7	7	7	6	7	6	7	6	7	6	7	6	7	6
Sudan	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
Egypt	6	5	6	5	6	5	6	5	6	5	6	5	6	5

Tunisia	6	5	6	5	6	5	7	5	7	5	7	5	7	5
U.S.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
France	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

Average 1 includes average scores for all the Arabic countries except Tunisia

Average 2 includes average scores for all the Arabic countries except Egypt

CL stands for civil liberties scores, ranging from 1 to 7, 1 being the highest, 7 the lowest

PR stands for political rights scores, ranging from 1 to 7, 1 being the highest, 7 the lowest

The year stated is the actual year recorded (not the year the report is released)

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